Why Law Prevades Medicine: An Essay on Ethics in Health Care by Scott, Charity
Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics & Public Policy
Volume 14
Issue 1 Symposium on Ethics Article 9
February 2014
Why Law Prevades Medicine: An Essay on Ethics
in Health Care
Charity Scott
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndjlepp
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics & Public Policy at NDLScholarship. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics & Public Policy by an authorized administrator of NDLScholarship. For more information,
please contact lawdr@nd.edu.
Recommended Citation
Charity Scott, Why Law Prevades Medicine: An Essay on Ethics in Health Care, 14 Notre Dame J.L. Ethics & Pub. Pol'y 245 (2000).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndjlepp/vol14/iss1/9
WHY LAW PERVADES MEDICINE: AN ESSAY ON
ETHICS IN HEALTH CARE
CHARITY Scorr*
Law pervades medicine because ethics pervades medicine,
and in America, we use the law to resolve ethical dilemmas in
health care.
Law deals with ethics? Many people react with surprise,
amusement, or cynicism when they see those two words-law and
ethics-together in the same sentence. To many people, the two
concepts seem wholly distinct, like the proverbial apples and
oranges, or even radically opposed, as different as night and day.
In medical circles, one senses an antagonism to law, not just to
lawyers. On hospital ethics committees, talk of law as well as law-
yers may be banned from the ethical discussions. On medical
rounds, I may be asked to help the residents and medical stu-
dents keep a bright line between law and ethics so that, I am told,
they'll know when they're dealing with one and not the other.
A central thesis of this essay is that there is no such bright
line between law and ethics in America, at least not in medicine.
During the second half of the twentieth century, most difficult
issues in health care which have raised profound ethical dilem-
mas have been addressed by law. For better or for worse, law and
ethics have been evolving in health care together; hand in glove
is perhaps the more apt simile. The central purpose of this essay
is to foster understanding by both legal and health care profes-
sionals about how law has influenced the ethical evolution of
medicine and health care in America during the past several
decades.
Part I analyzes the relationship between law and ethics gen-
erally in health care. It posits that law reflects a consensus state-
ment by our society on what we believe to be ethically
appropriate behavior, or on how we believe ethical dilemmas
ought to be resolved. Like ethics, law fundamentally asks what,
* Charity Scott is Professor of Law at Georgia State University College of
Law; Faculty Ethics Fellow, Emory University Center for Ethics in Public Policy
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under all the circumstances, would be the right thing to do?'
Using several examples of federal legislation, Part I illustrates
how our laws have reflected our society's evolving views on ethics
in professional and business practices in health care. Unlike eth-
ics, however, law also serves to enforce the socially agreed-upon
views of right and wrong. Paradoxically and unfortunately, when
law becomes the primary enforcer of ethical views, its power can
create problems, or pitfalls, for continued ethical reflection on
the very issues that it was called upon to address in the first place.
Part II recounts the evolution of medical ethics at the
patient's bedside. Through the lenses of law and ethics, this Part
focuses on patients and their relationships to the professionals
who provide them health care. It explores how law has sup-
ported the ethical concepts of patient autonomy and respect for
persons through the legal doctrines of patients' right to consent
to and to refuse medical treatment. Through the example of
informed consent doctrine and our growing obsession with
informed consent forms, this Part illustrates how law's power to
enforce an ethical ideal of genuine dialogue between doctors
and patients has created a pitfall for ethical reflection about the
actual conversations between patients and the professionals who
care for them.
Part III examines the recent attention to business ethics in
the administrative offices and boardrooms of health care organi-
zations. Increasing marketplace competition has prompted
health care organizations increasingly to focus on profits, or at
least on financial viability, which in turn has created ethical
dilemmas which in turn have been addressed by law. Focusing
on managed care and the Joint Commission on the Accreditation
1. On ethics' inquiry into right and wrong, see Deborah Caswell & H. Gill
Cryer, Nursing Grand Rounds: Case Study: When the Nurse and Physician Don't Agree,
9 J. CARIovAscuLAR NuRs. 30, 37 (1995) ("Traditionally, ethics has been
defined as the inquiry into rules and principles of morality, of right and wrong
conduct, of virtue and vice, and of good and evil as they relate to conduct.");
Bethany Spielman, Invoking the Law in Ethics Consultation, 2 CAMBRIDGE Q.
HALTHCARE ETHICS 457, 464 (1993) (stating that ethics is "an attempt to
answer the question: what, all things considered, ought to be done in a given
situation?"). On law's inquiry, see ROGER B. DWORKIN, LIMITS: THE ROLE OF
LAW IN BIOETHIcAL DECISION MAKING 6-7 (1996):
Paul Freund put it best: "The law is dialectic in a deeper sense than its
adversary process. It mediates most significantly between right and
right." . . . The only questions that matter for the law are those in
which there is something "right," or good, on both or all sides of the
controversy.... When right exists on both sides of an issue, the job of
the law is to mediate between the "rights," to accommodate, to adjust,
to attempt to sacrifice as little as possible of what is "right" on both
sides.
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of Health Care Organizations (JCAHO), Part III examines the
evolution of organization ethics and corporate health law in the
business of health care delivery. All of the business practices
which raise ethical issues that JCAHO now requires a hospital's
business ethics code to address-billing, marketing, patient
admissions, transfer and discharge, conflicts of interest, and com-
pensation arrangements-are also addressed by health care laws
at both state and federal levels, providing civil as well as criminal
sanctions. Part III uses the recent flurry of corporate compliance
programs throughout the health care industry to illustrate the
paradox that law's power and pervasiveness can create pitfalls for
ethical reflection on the very issues that law was called upon to
address.
Part IV proposes an alternative to reliance on law as the pri-
mary articulation and enforcer of ethics in health care. Lawyers
have not usurped the power of health care providers to assume
leadership on ethics. The law never took it out of the hands of
health care professionals to strive for the ethical high ground.
Until those in the health care field-individual practitioners to
high-level managers-assert their authority and responsibility for
charting the ethical direction of medicine and health care, law
will continue to pervade their professions and their institutions.
I. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN LAW AND ETHICS IN
HEALTH CARE
A. Law as a Consensus Statement on Ethics
While lawyers may suffer some unpopularity, the law still
reflects society's idealism. Immanuel Kant believed that: "The
greatest problem for the human species, the solution of which
nature compels him to seek, is that of attaining a civil society
which can administer justice universally."2 Justice is an ethical
concept of universal fairness for and among individuals; law is
the vehicle by which a society attempts to achieve this lofty ideal.
Oliver Wendell Holmes observed that: "The law is the witness
and external deposit of our moral life. Its history is the history of
the moral development of the race."' Thus the law reflects what,
2. Immanuel Kant, Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose,
Fifth Proposition, in KANT: POLITICAL WRITINGS 45 (Hans Reiss ed. & H. B. Nisbet
trans., 1991).
3. Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457
(1897). See also Daniel Callahan, Escaping from Legalism: Is It Possible?, HASTINGS
CENTER REP., Nov.-Dec. 1996, at 34 ("No myth is so hardy as the notion that 'you
can't legislate morality,' which of course we do all the time.").
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at any given point in time, society views as acceptable, ethically
appropriate behavior.
We often enact our moral views in our laws; in effect, we
legislate morality. Looking at our laws is like looking at a snap-
shot in time of our society's moral views about how people ought
to behave towards each other. Over time we may change our
views as to which behaviors are right or wrong, and we reflect
that change by changing our laws. For example, for some consid-
erable time in our nation's history we regarded it as morally
appropriate for individuals of different color or gender to be
treated differently. We reflected those views in our laws gov-
erning who could vote, who could own property, who could be
educated in which schools, who could marry whom, who could
eat or work or live where, and so forth. Today, our anti-discrimi-
nation laws reflect the moral view that it is wrong to perpetuate
those distinctions among individuals in our society.
In health care, our society has used the law to ask (and
answer) questions about what are ethically appropriate behaviors
among those who provide, or receive, or pay for health care serv-
ices. Frequently, the law is a reaction to perceived ethical wrong-
doing in health care. As discussed below, federal laws over the
past three decades illustrate how American society has reacted to
perceived or potential ethical abuses in health care by calling for
laws to resolve the ethical conflicts. The legal resolution in effect
becomes a societal consensus statement on ethics, at least for the
time being and until the laws are changed.4
4. As used in this essay, the word "consensus" does not imply unanimity
or complete agreement on a proposition, but rather a sense of general agree-
ment. In a democratic society, consensus among people may be represented by
a bare majority, as shown by those who represent the people and are elected to
reflect the people's views (as is true for majority passage of a piece of legisla-
tion), or by a supermajority, as is required for the passage of constitutional
amendments. Consensus may be reflected in court decisions as well, whether
there may be one or two controversial court decisions, or a trend among many
court decisions, at the federal or state level which are not overturned by a legis-
lature, and may in fact be supported by subsequent legislation. See infra note 36
and accompanying text. Law frequently serves as society's forum for airing and
resolving ethical debate. See infra notes 41-43 and accompanying text. Legisla-
tures and courts may sometimes be responding reactively to changing societal
views on what is ethically appropriate behavior. They may sometimes be creat-
ing proactively these changes in social opinion. Whether proactive or reactive,
the laws that endure reflect our society's views about ethical behavior in health
care.
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1. The 1970s and 1980s: Patient Care and Medical Ethics
Federal law was used to address an ethical dilemma caused
by the shortage in the 1960s of hemodialysis machines to treat
patients with kidney disease. To allocate these scarce resources
in Washington, a group (later dubbed the "Seattle God Commit-
tee") was given authority to decide, according to various "social
worth" criteria, which patients would or would not be given this
treatment. Patients were evaluated according to, among other
things: age, gender, income and net worth, marital status,
number of dependents, educational and employment back-
ground, and their "past performance and future potential."5
Societal unease about the ethics of this form of health care
rationing found expression in the enactment of the Social Secur-
ity Amendments of 1972, allowing Medicare reimbursement for
most patients with end-stage renal disease.6
Federal law was enacted in the 1970s to address the ethical
issues raised by the decades-long decision by the U.S. Depart-
ment of Public Health to deprive hundreds of African-American
men in rural Alabama of available antibiotics to treat syphilis.
7
Government officials who authorized the Tuskegee Syphilis
Study viewed it as an opportunity to benefit both scientific
research and the Southern black community.8 After the public
revelations and congressional hearings, however, society reacted
to what it judged to have been unethical behavior by enacting
national laws to develop ethical standards for the protection of
human research subjects.'
5. Maxwell J. Mehlman, Rationing Expensive Lifesaving Medical Treatments,
1985 Wis. L. REv. 239, 256 (criticized for preferring Sunday school teachers and
scout leaders, the "Seattle God Committee" had policies that "ruled out creative
nonconformists who rub the bourgeoisie the wrong way.... The Pacific North-
west is no place for a Henry David Thoreau with bad kidneys."); id. at 256 (quot-
ing Sanders & Dukeminier, Medical Advance and Legal Lag: Hemodialysis and
Kidney Transplantation, 15 UCLA L. Rxv. 357, 377 (1968)).
6. See id. at 247-48. See also 42 U.S.C. § 426-1 (1991) (concerning end-
stage renal disease program).
7. See generally JAMES JONES, BAD BLOOD: THE TUSKEGEE SYPHILIS EXPERI-
MENT (1992) [hereinafter JONES, BAD BLOOD]; Ad Hoc Advisory Panel, Final
Report of the Tuskegee Syphilis Study, U.S. Dept. of Health, Education, and Welfare,
Public Health Service (1975).
8. See JONES, BAD BLOOD, supra note 7, at 94 ("Such a study would be an
expression of concern for Negro health problems, keeping the PHS involved as
a vital force in promoting medical attention to blacks[,] and that Macon
County presented a 'ready-made situation . . . for carrying on the proposed
study' of untreated syphilis in Negroes."). See also infra note 18 and accompany-
ing text.
9. See generally 2 BARRY R. FuRRow ET AL., HEALTH LAw § 23-1 (1995). In
1974, the National Research Act established the National Commission for the
2000]
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In the 1980s, conflicting ethical views about what was appro-
priate medical care for critically ill newborns were socially
expressed by the legal controversy over the so-called Baby Doe
regulations.' 0 Promulgated by the Reagan administration, these
regulations prohibited hospitals from withholding life-sustaining
treatment from very ill infants solely by reason of their handi-
caps," and allowed the federal government to monitor medical
treatment decisions as potential violations of federal anti-discrim-
ination laws through twenty-four-hour hot lines and warning
notices posted in hospitals.' 2 These regulations have since been
invalidated by the Supreme Court.1" Alternative legislation was
subsequently enacted which represented a compromise between
the ethical positions held by those (primarily doctors' groups)
who believed such treatment decisions should largely be left to
the discretion of parents and physicians, and those (primarily
advocates for the disabled) who believed that the treatment deci-
sions should not based on predictions about an infant's future
"quality of life."' 4
Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research to "con-
duct a comprehensive investigation and study to identify basic ethical princi-
ples" for the conduct of human subjects research. Id. at 549.
10. See 45 C.F.R. § 84.55 (1985). Subsections (b) through (e) were later
invalidated by the Supreme Court in Bowen v. American Hospital Association, 476
U.S. 610 (1986).
11. See Alexander Morgan Capron, Baby Ryan and Virtual Futility, HAS-
rINGS CENTER REP., Mar.-Apr. 1995, at 20-21.
12. See 45 C.F.R. § 84.55(b)(3) (1985) (stating that hospitals were
required to post notices that declared: "It is the policy of this hospital, consis-
tent with Federal law, that, nourishment and medically beneficial treatment...
should not be withheld from handicapped infants solely on the basis of their
present or anticipated mental or physical impairments."). See also Sarah Glazer,
Born Too Soon, Too Small, Too Sick: Whatever Happened to Baby Doe?, WASHINGTON
POST, Apr. 2, 1991, at Z8.
13. See Bowen v. American Hosp. Ass'n, 476 U.S. 610 (1986).
14. See Capron, supra note 11, at 21; Glazer, supra note 12. While the first
Baby Doe regulations treated nontreatment of critically ill infants by health-care
providers as a potential violation of federal discrimination laws, the Child Abuse
and Neglect Amendments of 1984 (42 U.S.C. §§ 5101-03) shifted the focus to
parental decision-making under state law, requiring reports to state child wel-
fare agencies only when medical treatment decisions might be viewed under
state law as child neglect. See Mary Crossley, Infants With Anencephaly, the ADA,
and the Child Abuse Amendments, 11 ISSUES L. & MED. 379, 407-08 (1996):
[T] he Amendments effectively define when parental decisions regard-
ing nontreatment for infants with disabilities threaten such serious
harm that state authorities should review those decisions.... A paren-
tal choice falling below this floor is suspect, and the Amendments
accordingly require reporting of the case to state authorities so that
the state can determine whether there exists a need to intervene to
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That a health care law can represent society's views on ethics
was also illustrated by the 1980s controversy over so-called
"patient dumping," or the practice by many private hospitals of
transferring poor or uninsured emergency patients to public hos-
pitals. Prior to the 1980s, hospitals generally had no obligation
under state and federal law to give life-saving treatment to emer-
gency patients, or to provide obstetrical care to women in labor,
if these patients could not pay for these services. 15 Congressional
hearings on the nationwide problem of patient-dumping
resulted in the Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor
Act.1 6 Prompted by societal concern over individual patient hor-
ror stories, the Act reflected emerging societal agreement that it
was wrong for hospitals to refuse to treat women in labor or
patients in a potentially life-threatening emergency based on
their inability to pay.
In each of these four examples, the activities that gave rise to
the public controversies and subsequent legislation posed impor-
tant and debatable ethical questions in health care. Many of the
actors at the time did not regard their actions as ethically prob-
lematic, even if others later did. The members of the Seattle
God Committee 7 and those who authorized the Tuskegee
Syphilis Study18 believed their activities to be ethical promotions
prevent or remedy medical neglect. Medical choices not falling below
this floor are left to unfettered parental discretion.
15. For a good account of the state of the law prior to EMTALA, see gen-
erally Karen H. Rothenberg, Who Cares? The Evolution of the Legal Duty to Provide
Emergency Care, 26 Hous. L. REv. 21 (1989).
16. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (1992). See generally Lynn Healy Scaduto, Com-
ment, The Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act.Gone Astray: A Proposal
to Reclaim EMTALA for Its Intended Beneficiaries, 46 UCLA L. REv. 943, 948 (1999)
(stating that the legislative intent "behind EMTALA was to deter what Congress
perceived to be the burgeoning practice among hospital emergency rooms of
dumping indigent and uninsured patients"). See infra notes 19, 84-90 and
accompanying text (discussing divergent legal and ethical views over providing
a right to receive medical treatment in America).
17. See GUIDO CAtLARESI & PHILIP BOBBrrr, TRAGIC CHOICES 186-89
(1978) (describing the Seattle God Committee's attempt to allocate kidneys in
a socially responsible way).
18. See supra note 8. See also Tom Junod, Deadly Medicine, GQ June 1993,
at 164, 170 (relating that one of the study's defenders, Dr. Sidney Orlansky,
later reflected on subsequent objections to the study: "After seeing these peo-
ple, knowing them and studying them and the record, I honestly feel that we
have done them no real harm and probably have helped them in many ways."
At a 1969 meeting at the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention in Atlanta
to discuss whether the study should continue, Dr. Orlansky continued to insist
that Tuskegee was "a good study[,]" and "that there were no medical grounds
for treating the men, that for the most part their syphilis was inactive and that
giving them penicillin could incur 'catastrophic consequences.'"). For a good
20001
252 NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 14
of the public good. The hospitals who transferred poor patients
to public hospitals rather than treat them did not view it as ethi-
cally wrong to decline to give service to someone who could not
pay for it.19 Certainly there remain sharply divergent views about
what constitutes the ethical treatment of critically ill newborns.
20
narrative presentation of the ethical dilemmas posed for those who participated
in the Tuskegee study, such as the white doctors and the black nurse who
worked with the male subjects of the study, see David Feldshuh, Miss Evers'Boys,
AMERiCAN THEATRE, Nov. 1990, a play which was made into a TV movie by
Home Box Office in 1997.
19. The ethical position of the hospitals is similar to that of doctors today,
who are under no legal obligation to provide free medical care to patients who
cannot pay for these services and who, according to a recent study, are provid-
ing less and less free care in health markets where managed care is prevalent.
See PeterJ. Cunningham et al., Managed Care and Physicians' Provision of Charity
Care, 281 JAMA 1087, 1087-92 (1999). The hospitals' "dumping" practice found
legal support (just as today, doctors' decisions not to provide charity care con-
tinues to find support) in the "no duty to rescue" doctrine of the law, which in
turn is premised on the ethical view that one is not morally obligated to go out
of one's way to help a stranger. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEE-
TON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 56 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter KEETON, LAW OF
TORTS]. This ethical debate goes back to scripture, with the moral quandary of
whether we are our brother's keeper. See Gen. 4:9 ("Then the Lord said to Cain,
'Where is your brother Abel?' 'I don't know,' he replied. 'Am I my brother's
keeper?'"). See also infra notes 39-40 and accompanying text. While Prosser
thought that the law has struck an inappropriate ethical balance in this doc-
trine, society has not generally agreed with him, by virtue of the doctrine's con-
tinuing without overruling by courts or legislation except in certain cases
involving special relationships, see KEETON, LAW OF TORTS, 375-77, or in specific
legislation like EMTALA addressing specific situations like emergency room
patients. For example, the view that there is no general moral obligation to
provide goods or services to people who cannot pay for them is currently
reflected in America's unwillingness to enact universal health care coverage,
although federal coverage has been enacted for targeted populations, such as
certain poor families through Medicaid, or the elderly or disabled through
Medicare. Reflecting perhaps basic ethical ambivalence in our society over
granting patients a right to receive health care, see infra notes 84-90 and accom-
panying text, government enforcement of EMTALA has allegedly been inade-
quate. See Lauren A. Dame, The Emergency Treatment and Active Labor Act: The
Anomalous Right to Health Care, 8 HEALTH MATRIX 3, 11-21 (1998). There contin-
ues to be lively academic debate over whether a right to emergency hospital
treatment regardless of ability to pay for it is "a good or a bad thing." Id. at 4,
28 ("the purpose of EMTALA, to protect patients at a time of scary and perhaps
desperate medical need, is noble and reflects the finer aspects of our medical
system"); cf. David A. Hyman, Patient Dumping and EMTALA: Past Imperfect/Future
Shock, 8 HEALTH MATRix 29 (1998) (arguing that "[t] he premise of the statute is
silly at best"); id. at 54-55 (suggesting that EMTALA is a "symbolic law" resulting
from "anecdotal advocacy" rather than hard data, and comparing it to "other
ineptly drafted, tunnel-visioned, short-sighted, and counterproductive laws").
20. SeeJudith Graham, Weighing Care for "Preemies", CHICAGO TRiB., Jan. 10,
1999, at 5 (noting that treatment decisions for extremely premature infants
continue to be highly controversial).
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The point is that in each case, the law was called upon to weigh
the merits of the differing ethical positions, to adopt some and
reject others (implicitly if not expressly), and to provide guide-
lines for what society agreed (by proxy, through the democratic
vote on the legislation) 21 would be considered unethical behav-
ior in the future. As a consensus statement on ethics, the law
reflected society's views, at least for the time being, of where the
ethical balance should be struck.
2. The 1990s: Managed Care and Business Ethics
Many of the legal controversies involving medical ethics in
the 1970s and 1980s tended to focus on perceived ethical
problems arising out of the provider-patient relationship. In
other words, these ethical questions frequently focused on how
those who provide health care services (the hospitals, doctors, or
researchers) should treat those who receive the services (the
patients) .22 By contrast, many of the ethical conflicts in health
care in the 1990s involve the business practices of payers (those
who pay for health care services, such as managed care and insur-
ance companies), which raise ethical questions about how the
payers should treat both patients and providers (particularly doc-
tors and hospitals) .23 Throughout the 1990s, providers and
21. See infra note 36 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 46-90 and accompanying text (discussing medical eth-
ics at the patient's bedside).
23. See infra notes 91-154 and accompanying text (discussing business eth-
ics in the boardrooms of health-care organizations). Many of these issues are
addressed in recent proposals for new federal legislation addressing managed
care reform, often referred to as "patient protection" legislation or a "patients'
bill of rights." These proposals have been the subject of contentious Congres-
sional debate during 1998 and 1999. See generally Mary Agnes Carey, Patients'
Rights May Die Aborning, CQ WEEKLY, Aug. 1, 1998, at 2074-82. Efforts to pass a
federal patients' bill of rights during 1998 became deadlocked by October. See
Senate Defeats Final Democratic Effort to Force Debate on Managed Care Bills, 7
HEALTH L. REP. (BNA) 1642 (Oct. 5, 1998). In early 1999, competing Demo-
cratic and Republican bills were re-introduced, and they illustrate how politi-
cally divisive the debate over patients' rights is, with the sides in the debate
largely following party lines. See Geri Aston, Patient Protections Follow Party Lines,
Am. MED. NEWS, Apr. 5, 1999, at 5. In October 1999, the House managed to
pass a bipartisan bill which provided broader patient protections than did a
Senate bill which was passed in July 1999. See Geri Aston, 'A Big Win for Patients,
AM. MED. NEWS, Oct. 25, 1999, at I [hereinafter Aston, A Big Win]. As of this
writing, it is predicted that negotiations for compromise legislation between the
House and Senate will be difficult. See Jonathan Gardner, House Vote Sets the
Stage: Conference Panel Must Iron Out Differences On Patient Protection, MODERN
HEALTHCARE (Oct. 11, 1999); Norwood-Dingell Managed Care Bill Sails Through
House in Massive Bipartisan Vote, 8 HEALTH L. REP. (BNA) 1654 (Oct. 14, 1999).
See also Wendy K. Mariner, Going Hollywood with Patient Rights in Managed Care,
2000]
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patients alike have vociferously expressed their sense of ethical
wrong-doing by insurers and managed care companies who, for
example, attempt to insert so-called "gag clauses" in their con-
tracts with physicians; 24 who may try to cut costs by limiting hos-
pital stays down to the point of paying only for so-called "drive-
through" deliveries 25 and "drive-through" mastectomies;26 who
may create financial incentives for doctors to deny or limit care
27
281 JAMA 861 (1999) (distinguishing "consumer rights" from "patient rights" as
the focus of recent managed care reform proposals).
24. In August 1998, the federal Office of Personnel Management issued a
final rule, 63 Fed. Reg. 42584 (1998), banning "gag clauses" from contracts with
insurers which participate in the federal employees' health benefits program.
See OPM Issues Final Rule on Gag Clauses in Federal Employees Health Coverage, 7
HEALTH L. REP. (BNA) 1297 (Aug. 13, 1998) (stating that contracts may not
provide any direct or indirect incentives to restrict what providers may discuss
with patients about treatment options; rule is designed to bring federal pro-
grams into compliance with proposals for federal "patients' bill of rights"). Fed-
eral managed care reform proposals would also ban gag clauses. See Comparison
of Major Provisions of Democratic, Republican Patients' Bill of Rights Legislation, 8
HEALTH L. REp. (BNA) 1145 (July 15, 1999). Currently, 47 states prohibit any
gag clauses which limit a physician's ability to discuss treatment options with
patients. See NCSL State-By-State Report Details Wide Range of Consumer Protection
Laws, 8 HEALTH L. REP. (BNA) 1282 (Aug. 5, 1999) [hereinafter State-By-State
Report]. Similarly, Georgia's Patient Protection Act of 1996 also provides that
no health care provider may be penalized for discussing medically necessary or
appropriate care with a patient. See GA. CODE ANN. § 33-20A-7 (1997). See gener-
ally Jennifer L. Myron, HMOs' Use of Gag Clauses: An Unethical Threat to America's
Health, 101 DICK. L. REv. 729 (1997).
25. See the federal Newborns' and Mothers' Health Protection Act of
1996, 29 U.S.C.A. § 1185 (1999), for which implementing federal regulations
are expected. See also HIPAA: Maternity Stay Rule Released; Spells Out When Cover-
age Starts, 7 HEALTH L. REP. (BNA) 1715 (Oct. 29, 1998) (noting that federal law
requires group health plans with maternity benefits to allow 48-hour hospital
stays after normal vaginal births and 96-hour hospital stays for cesarean section
deliveries). See also Georgia's Newborn Baby and Mother Protection Act, GA.
CODE ANN. § 33-24-58 (1996) (stating similar provisions).
26. 19 states have passed legislation requiring minimum lengths of time
for hospital stays following a mastectomy. See State-By-State Report, supra note 24.
The Senate version of proposed patient protection legislation which passed in
July 1999 would ban "drive-through" mastectomies and would require health
plans to pay for hospital stays for whatever length of time deemed appropriate
by the patient and her physician. See Senate Appoints Managed Care Conferees;
GOP Leadership Urged to Respect House Vote, 8 HEALTH L. REP. (BNA) 1688 (Oct.
21, 1999) [hereinafter Senate Appoints].
27. Concern over financially-motivated denials of care is one of the most
contentious issues surrounding managed care. See infra notes 135-39 and
accompanying text. See generally Henry T. Greely, Direct Financial Incentives in
Managed Care: Unanswered Questions, 6 HEALTH MATRIx 53 (1996); David Oren-
tlicher, Paying Physicians More to Do Less: Financial Incentives to Limit Care, 30 U.
RICH. L. REv. 155 (1996). For a controversial recent case involving this issue,
see Herdrich v. Pegram, 154 F.3d 362, 380 (7th Cir. 1998) (holding that com-
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or otherwise interfere with the doctor-patient relationship by
denying payment for care that the patient needs and the doctor
wants to provide;21 who impose restrictions on patients' choice of
plaint was sufficient to state a claim for breach of fiduciary duty under ERISA
where plaintiff alleged that defendants' incentive system depleted health plan
resources so as to benefit physicians who administered the plan, possibly to the
detriment of patients), cert. granted, 120 S.Ct. 10 (1999); see also Shea v. Esen-
sten, 107 F.3d 627 (8th Cir. 1997) (allowing breach of fiduciary duty claim
under ERISA for failure to disclose financial incentives). The potential for
financial incentives to result in medically inappropriate denials or limitations of
care is addressed in some states' recent managed care legislation, such as Geor-
gia's Patient Protection Act of 1996 which prohibits a managed care plan from
using a financial incentive program that directly compensates a health provider
for ordering or providing less than medically necessary and appropriate care to
his or her patients. See GA. CODE ANN. § 33-20A-6 (1996). See generally Lead
Report, Physician Incentive Plans: States Tell Health Plans that Incentives May Not
Limit Medically Necessary Care, 7 HEALTH L. REP. (BNA) 1581 (Oct. 8, 1998) (stat-
ing that 21 states currently prohibit managed care plans from using financial
incentives to induce phsyicians to restrict medically necessary services).
28. Getting insurers to approve doctors' medical treatment recommenda-
tions for their patients has been one of the "most frustrating and infuriating
features" of dealing with managed care, and recently one major HMO
announced it would no longer require such prior approvals-a move popularly
viewed as returning decision-making power over patient care to the physicians.
SeeJennifer Steinhauer & Milt Freudenheim, H.M.O. 's Shift May Please Patients,
but Raise Costs, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 10, 1999, at Cl. Other health plans are also
eliminating unpopular restrictions or emphasizing alternative ways to control
costs which are less intrusive in the doctor-patient relationship. See Milt
Freudenheim, Medical Insurers Revise Cost Control Efforts, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 3,
1999, at Al. Widespread dissatisfaction with managed care organizations' cost
control efforts which seem to interfere either with the patients' access to the
physicians or services they want or with their physicians' ability to obtain
approval for recommended treatment have resulted in a societal backlash
against HMOs, as reflected by the popular press in such cover stories as the one
which ran in Newsweek recently, picturing an angry patient and entitled "HMO
Hell: The War Over Patients' Rights." See NEWSWEEK, Nov. 8, 1999. Many peo-
ple accuse HMOs of "putting profits before patients," and call for laws to stop
their unethical practices. Geoffrey Cowley & Bill Turque, Critical Condition,
NEWSWEEK, Nov. 8, 1999, at 58-62; Russell Watson, HMO Hell: The Backlash-
HMOs Go Under the Knife, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 8, 1999, at 63-68. Anecdotal accounts
of HMO denials of treatment which have resulted in injury or death are now
routinely related in the popular media and in congressional hearings on pro-
posed legislation. See, e.g., David E. Rosenbaum, House Hears Grim Tales About
Managed Care, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8, 1999, at A23; Robin Toner, Many Doctors Tell of
Denial of Coverage by H.M.O. 's, N.Y. TiMES, July 29, 1999, at A18. HMO denials
of coverage have also been the subject of numerous lawsuits. See infra note 138.
Whether physicians or health plans should determine whether a given treat-
ment is "medically necessary" is another "flash point in the congressional
debate on managed care patient protections." Geri Aston, Patients' Rights Back-
ers Seek Clear Definition of Medical Necessity, Am. MED. NEWS, Mar. 15, 1999, at 9.
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provider; 29 who appear to lack protections for the confidentiality
of patients' records;30 or who will not pay for emergency services
without a lot of pre-authorization red tape.3
29. The House and Senate versions of proposed patients' bill of rights
legislation differ as to whether to allow patients to have direct access to special-
ists, or to allow health plans to require a referral from a primary care physician
or case manager before a patient may see a specialist. See Senate Appoints, supra
note 26. 36 states allow women either to choose an obstetric/gynecological
specialist as her primary care physician or to have direct access to these special-
ist services without first having to get a referral. See State-By-State Report, supra
note 24.
30. Dating back to the Hippocratic Oath, keeping the confidences of
patients has been a foundational ethical tenet of the health-care professions.
Respect for individual privacy has never been an absolute principle, however,
and it often has given way to competing ethical concerns for the welfare of the
community. See Amitai Etzioni, Medical Records: Enhancing Privacy, Preserving the
Common Good, 29 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 14 (Mar.-Apr. 1999). Finding social
consensus on where the balance is properly struck among the competing ethi-
cal concerns in myriad health care situations has proven enormously difficult,
however, as reflected in our failure to enact uniform federal legislation in this
area despite years of Congressional debate. Most recently, Congress missed its
own self-imposed deadline of August 21, 1999 to enact comprehensive medical
privacy legislation. Congress established this deadline three years ago when it
enacted the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996
(HIPAA) and it further provided that the Department of Health and Human
Services (HHS) should enact regulations governing the privacy of individually
identifiable health information by February 21, 2000, if Congress did not enact
legislation by its deadline. See Pub. L. No. 104-191, § 264(c)(1) (1996). On
November 3, 1999, the Secretary of HHS issued proposed medical privacy regu-
lations, 45 C.F.R. pts. 160 to 164, and she has extended the deadline for public
comments until February 17, 2000. See Dept. Health & Human Services, Admin-
istrative Simplification (visited Feb. 15, 2000) < The societal call for minimum
federal rules is responsive to the multitude and intricacies of each state's differ-
ent laws governing medical privacy, of which a comprehensive survey was
recently published by the Health Privacy Project of Georgetown University. See
Georgetown University Institute for Health Care & Policy, The State of Health
Privacy: An Uneven Terrain (visited Feb. 15, 2000) <http://www.healthprivacy.
org/resources/statereports/contents.html>.
31. Emergency care coverage creates tensions between assuring patients
access for true emergencies and allowing health plans to control their costs by
restricting patients from using the E.R. as a convenient substitute for a doctor's
visit. See Daniel B. Moskowitz, Emergency Care: In Search of Balance, 17 Bus. &
HEALTH 15 (1999). Competing versions of proposed federal patients' bill of
rights legislation differ in the extent to which emergency services are required
to be covered by a health plan. See Geri Aston, Patient Protection Bills Differ, Even
in the 'Common Ground, Am. MED. NEWS, Apr. 12, 1999, at 5 (noting wide varia-
tions on emergency coverage provisions in competing proposals); Senate
Appoints, supra note 26 (H.R. 2990 would allow patients to get more services
covered by a health plan in connection with out-of-network emergency care
than would S. 1344). 37 states have passed laws requiring health plans to cover
emergency services. See State-By-State Report, supra note 24. Georgia's Patient
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The HMOs and insurance companies who engage in these
behaviors do not view them as wrong or unethical: on the con-
trary, it is just good business to try to contain costs and allocate
health care rationally. But others in our society view these behav-
iors as ethically wrong, unfair, or abusive. And where do they go
when their sense of moral outrage gets strong enough? To the
law, of course. Each of these asserted unethical behaviors has
generated calls for social resolution, principally by legal ban at
federal and state levels. In the past few years, new legislation in
Georgia32 and other states3 has addressed, or has been proposed
to address, many of these issues. Competing Democratic and
Republican proposals for "patient protection" legislation or a
"patients' bill of rights," which have been the focus of so much
Congressional debate over the past two years, also address many
of these same concerns. 34 As was true for the debates over medi-
cal ethics in earlier decades, these calls for legal reform in the
1990s reflect societal judgment about the ethics of many health
care business practices.
B. Law as Enforcer of Socially Agreed-Upon Values: Law Packs
Ethics With a Punch
While law and ethics both focus on questions of right and
wrong in human relationships, they differ starkly in their ability
to enforce ethical behavior. Ethics is aspirational only: it posits
ethical ideals for human behavior. If we say "ought," we mean
ethics. By contrast, law provides penalties for failure to abide by
Protection Act of 1996 allows emergency services to be provided without prior
managed care authorization. See GA. CODE ANN. § 33-20-9 (1996).
32. See The Patient Protection Act of 1996, GA. CODE ANN. §§ 33-20A-1 to
-10 (1996). Recent legislation amended this Act and, among other things, it
gave insureds the right to sue their HMOs for coverage decisions. See Georgia:
Governor Signs Managed Care Bills Allowing Physician Choice, HMO Lawsuits, 8
HEALTH L. REP. (BNA) 653 (Apr. 22, 1999) (discussing GA. CODE ANN. §§ 51-1-
48 & 51-1-49 (1999)). Georgia became the second state in the country (after
Texas) to allow such lawsuits against HMOs. See William G. Schiffbauer & Dean
A. Rosen, Georgia's Application of Liability to Benefit Administration Ignores Legal
Precedent, 8 HEALTH L. REP. (BNA) 1212 (July 22, 1999) (comparing Texas and
Georgia HMO liability legislation).
33. See generally Plan Regulation: Senate Labor Panel Set to Begin Work on Man-
aged Care Legislation March 17, BNA's HEALTH CARE DuALY REP., Mar. 12, 1999
(summarizing state legislation on patient rights); State Legislation: Managed Care
Bills Top State Agendas in 1999; Legislation Pending in Every State, 7 HEALTH L. REP.
(BNA) 1996 (Dec. 17, 1998); State Legislation: State Managed Care Laws Vary
Widely, Few Have Broad Protections, Report Says, 7 HEALTH L. REP. (BNA) 1162
(July 23, 1998).
34. See generally supra notes 23-31. For a comparison of the competing
House and Senate bills, see generally Senate Appoints, supra note 26.
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socially-agreed upon ethical norms. 5 If we say "must," we mean
law. The old adage that "virtue is its own reward" is only partially
true: sometimes the threat of jail time or heavy monetary penal-
ties can provide a more compelling incentive for virtuous behav-
ior than simple knowledge that one is "doing the right thing."
Law packs ethics with the "punch" of potential sanctions.
C. Clarification about the Consensus
While law often serves these two primary roles-expressing
social agreement on what is ethically inappropriate behavior
between individuals, and backing that agreement up with penal-
ties for violation-two further points are needed to clarify the
nature of this social agreement.
1. Consensus Reflects General Agreement, Not Unanimity
First, by societal "consensus" or social "agreement" this essay
does not mean to suggest that everyone in society agrees that the
ethically correct resolution has been expressed by the law in
every case. Plenty of people obviously will disagree. We live,
after all, in a pluralistic society where uniformity of opinion is
virtually impossible. What is meant by "consensus" is less than
unanimity and more a sense of general agreement. Whether a
bare majority or a substantial majority, "consensus" in this essay
means a democratic resolution we have agreed to abide by in our
social contract, even if individually some (or even many) of us
believe a particular resolution is.wrong. 6
35. See GEORGE J. ANNAS, THE STANDARD OF CARE: THE LAW OF AMERICAN
BIOETHICS 6 (1993):
[L]aw and ethics are distinct, though related, activities. The law is
mandatory, setting standards that can only be breached at the risk of
civil or criminal liability. Ethics is aspirational, setting forth universal
goals that we should try to meet, but for which we suffer no temporal
penalty when falling short.
DWORKIN, supra note 1, at 4 ("[L]aw and ethics are not the same thing. Ethics is
a branch of philosophy that considers how persons and institutions ought to
behave. It claims for itself no temporal sanctions to ensure compliance or pun-
ish deviation. Law, conversely, is entirely temporal and very much involved with
sanctions.").
36. Even controversial Supreme Court decisions, or other court deci-
sions, can be taken as "consensus" statements in the sense that these judicial
opinions may be interpreting legislation or constitutional provisions which have
been adopted by majorities through democratic process. On the other hand, if
one thinks judges may be "legislating," or creating new law, through such judi-
cial interpretation, then it may be harder to characterize these opinions as
"consensus" statements, at least when they are first authored. The same may be
true for judicial common law developments. To the extent that such judicial
interpretations "stand the test of time," however, and are not overturned by
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2. Law Sets Ethical Minimums, Not Maximums
Second, through the law, our society does not attempt to
agree upon all conduct which is ethical, and all conduct which is
unethical. Law performs a much narrower function. In the uni-
verse of ethics, right and wrong behaviors lie along a spectrum,
with ethically good or even ideal conduct at one end (perhaps we
could agree to put honesty, loyalty, generosity, altruism, and
respect for others at this end) and ethically bad behavior at the
other end (most of us might place murder, lying, cheating, and
stealing, for example, at this end). Much of human behavior lies
somewhere in the middle, where there is significant division of
social opinion as to whether or to what extent it may be right or
wrong, good or bad, acceptable or unacceptable. Society often
uses law to identify those behaviors primarily at one end of the
spectrum: those behaviors about which there is general agree-
ment that they are unethical, wrong, or unacceptable." In our
society, we often express our consensus about behavior being
ethically wrong by making it illegal.3" But that leaves much con-
later legislation, case law, or constitutional amendment, their continued vitality
suggests that they reflect this kind of "consensus," or general agreement, on the
correctness of their ethical resolutions. See supra note 4. The amount of con-
troversy (or lack thereof) generated over a statute or court decision may well be
a gauge of the breadth of the consensus over it. See Alexander Morgan Capron,
Morality and the State, Law, and Legalism, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Nov.-Dec. 1996,
at 35-37:
To some extent, all societies attempt to direct behavior into approved
channels by criminalizing certain conduct. In doing so, law is not
merely enforcing morality, but reinforcing it, and society's success on
the first score is heavily dependent on the second, that is, on whether
a broad consensus is achieved on the underlying moral view. When
wide agreement exists, the law is at once less visible and more
powerful.
37. Corporations often use codes of ethics to do the same thing. One
author contrasts two approaches to business ethics codes: the "personal integ-
rity" approach (which tends also to be the focus of the law) and the "social
responsibility approach" (concerning ethical conduct which law leaves largely
unaddressed). See Leonard J. Weber, The Business of Ethics, HEALTH PROGRESS,
Jan.-Feb. 1990, at 76-78. Like the "personal integrity" approach, law focuses
more on issues of individual integrity (conflicts of interest, self-dealing or self-
interested transactions) rather than those of social responsibility. See infra note
148 and accompanying text.
38. It should be clarified that not everything that is illegal is unethical.
The law is addressed both to acts which are malum in se (a wrong in itself, some-
thing inherently wrong based on natural or moral principles) and to acts which
are malum prohibitum (something which is wrong because it is prohibited, but is
not inherently immoral). See BLACK'S LAW DIc'noNARV 494 (5th ed. 1983).
Murder and theft are examples of illegal acts which are malum in se, while
double parking and jaywalking are legal wrongs, not because these actions vio-
late moral principles, but simply because they are prohibited by law. In other
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duct-perhaps most human conduct-simply not addressed by
law, and over which there may be significant differences of
opinion.
By addressing what we have generally agreed is wrong behav-
ior or bad actions, the law sets the legal minimums for behavior;
it does not address the ethical maximums. The law provides
sanctions for wrongdoing; it does not tend to provide rewards for
doing good or even sanctions for failing to do good.39 The law
will punish you if you hit a person and leave him bleeding in the
street; but if you are walking down the street and happen to see
someone lying and bleeding in the gutter, the law will not penal-
ize you if you walk on by and fail to help him out.4" American
law does not require you to be the "Good Samaritan," nor reward
you if you are. That is the province of ethics-it goes beyond the
law.
D. Too Much Law in the Discourse of Medical Ethics?
1. Translating Moral Problems into Legal Problems
Some people may readily agree that law is the principal
forum where our society debates ethics, and yet they may still
deplore that this is so. The ethicist Daniel Callahan has recently
complained about the "elevation of moral judgments of the
courts as the moral standards of the land," and argues:
[U]nfortunately, because we do let the law legislate consid-
erable morality, or use moral arguments to overcome
existing bans, a great deal of the work of ethics ends up
being done in courtrooms and enshrined in legal deci-
sions .... [Law] may be the best institution we have [to
arbitrate moral questions], but it is a poor substitute for
moral consensus and public debate on ethics.4
words, we have some laws that reflect our society's ethical assessment of certain
conduct, and we have some other laws that simply make it possible to organize
civil society efficiently (like our rules of the road). This essay addresses only the
former kind of laws, which reflect societal views on matters of medical and busi-
ness ethics.
39. The law has long distinguished between acts and omissions, malfea-
sance and non-feasance, active misconduct and passive failure to take action to
prevent harm. As a general proposition, the law seeks to sanction only the for-
mer. See KEETON, LAW OF TORTS, supra note 19, at § 56.
40. See id. at 375 ("[T]he law has persistently refused to impose on a
stranger the moral obligation of common humanity to go to the aid of another
human being who is in danger, even if the other is in danger of losing his
life.").
41. Callahan, supra note 3, at 34-35.
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Certainly, there are problems with our society's translation
of moral problems into legal ones. Some commentators have
said that law is coercive, and tends to end public debate over
morality.4 2 Some may wish that the law considered more fully
what it means for individuals to be members of the community,
or that the law did not focus so narrowly on individual rights.43
And yet for better or for worse, we have not vested any other
forum besides the law with sufficient social clout and political
authority to decide these ethical questions. We may let our uni-
versities, places of worship, the media, public opinion surveyors,
or other social institutions raise these questions for us, but not
resolve them. Only law is given this authority, reflecting a social
agreement to abide by the resolutions it comes up with.
2. Law's Power to Enforce Creates Ethical Pitfalls
One serious problem with "legislating morality" is that when
law pervades ethical inquiry and backs its resolutions up with the
punch of potential liability, people frequently focus solely on
avoiding the punch. In responding to the so-called "chilling
effect" of the law, some of us sometimes overreact and assume
that we must do something, or must not do something, because
we think that's "what the law says," whether it makes any medical
sense or even common sense. Often lay people may not know
what the law says, or assume they know but in fact are wrong, but
they think, "never mind, it's better to be safe than sorry," and so
they engage in behaviors, or avoid behaviors, in order to comply
with what they blindly, and perhaps erroneously, assume the law
42. See Carl E. Schneider, Moral Discourse, Bioethics, and the Law, HASTINGS
CENTER REP., Nov.-Dec. 1996, at 37-39:
Once the judicial system has reached some sort of conclusion, then
the courts are poor friends of moral discourse. In short, I have been
arguing that the law's discourse conflicts with what we ordinarily mean
by discourse when it purports to reach an authoritative conclusion and
enforces it by claims that further debate is inappropriate and by force.
Indeed, it is exactly this aspect of legal discourse that makes it so
attractive to partisans of all sorts. Law is more than debate. It is coer-
cion. It is victory, or at least a gratifying step toward it.
43. See Gilbert Meilaender, Less Law? Or Different Law?, HASTINGS CENTER
REP., Nov.-Dec. 1996, at 39-40:
The danger, I think, is not exactly or not only that moral problems get
translated into legal problems and that discussion is then terminated.
Inevitably and necessarily the spheres [law and morality] must inter-
sect in countless ways .... What we need ... is an understanding of
law that accepts into public discussion outlooks that picture the
human being as more than just an isolated principle of will and
choice ....
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requires of them." This is the essence of "defensive medicine,"
sometimes reflecting misunderstandings about the law and
nearly always illustrating concern more about whether one can
get sued than about whether one is doing the right thing.45
Many lawyers, by the way, are also culpable on this score.
The very power of the law can create pitfalls for real ethical
reflection in other ways. Paradoxically, more law can result in
less ethical debate. When we focus on the law, we tend to lose
sight of the ethical underpinnings for it. In trying to focus on
the "letter of the law," we often lose sight of its "spirit." When law
becomes pervasive, we often forget about the original ethical
questions that prompted the legal resolutions. We also tend to
forget that generally, the law sets only the floor for ethical behav-
ior, and that we have come to societal consensus only on those
behaviors which fall below that ethical level. We get so focused
on making sure that our behavior does not fall below that floor-
that we cannot be held legally liable for something-that we do
not examine whether our behavior is reaching far enough
toward the ethical high ground. We worry only about avoiding
legal accountability, not about promoting ethical responsibility.
Our obsession with the law-or more particularly, with avoiding
law's punch-means that we tend to substitute our conformity
with the legal minimums for our need to reflect on the ethical
44. A good example of this problem arises in the treatment of critically ill
newborns. See supra notes 10-14 and accompanying text. A 1988 survey of
neonatalogists indicated that implementation of the Child Abuse and Neglect
Amendments of 1984 (and the second "Baby Doe" regulations still in effect)
resulted in "overtreatment, poor use of resources, and insufficient attention to
suffering." Loretta M. Kopelman et al., Do the "Baby Doe" Rules Ignore Suffering?,
18 SECOND OPINION 101, 101-13 (1993). According to one UCLA physician:
"I know of several instances where neonatalogists have used Baby Doe
regulations to convince a family that they had no choice but to con-
tinue to treat where the family wanted no treatment." . . . [In refer-
ence to the study above,] [o]ne third of the doctors who said that life-
sustaining surgery was not in an infant's best interests in a hypothetical
case said they believed such treatment nevertheless was required by
law. "The conclusion we drew is that the Baby Doe regulations [for
the Amendments] are causing many babies to be overtreated when
their conditions are hopeless .
Glazer, supra note 12, at Z8.
45. See generally Marshall B. Kapp, Treating Medical Charts Near the End of
Life: How Legal Anxieties Inhibit Good Patient Deaths, 28 U. TOL. L. REv. 521 (1997)
(discussing the negative influence of defensive medicine on the clinical and
ethical quality of medical care at the end of patients' lives). See also ANNAS,
supra note 35, at 4-5 ("It should be emphasized at the outset that any medical
treatment done primarily to protect the physician from potential lawsuits
(rather than to benefit the patient), although sometimes legal, is by definition
unethical.").
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maximums. We are too quickly satisfied that our compliance
with these legal minimums was all that ethics required us to do.
II. MEDICAL ETHICS AT THE BEDSIDE: LAW AND THE
RECOGNITION OF PATIENTS' RIGHTS
This Part examines law's influence on medical ethics at the
bedside, in particular on the doctor-patient relationship, and will
illustrate how law's power has created pitfalls for ethical reflec-
tion through the example of informed consent forms.46 The
law's recognition of patients' rights to consent to and to refuse to
receive medical treatment is solidly founded on ethical consider-
ations and, it is argued, reflects an emerging societal consensus
over how the ethical balance ought to be weighed between doc-
tor and patient at the bedside. Over the past several decades, the
courts, legislatures, and society at large have coalesced in the
view that a competent adult patient has the right to consent, or
to refuse to consent, to medical treatment, even if her health
caregivers vehemently disagree with her decision. By contrast,
society has not come to a consensus on whether patients should
be entitled to receive medical treatment, if, for example, the
patient cannot pay for it, or if the doctor thinks it is not medi-
cally appropriate, or if the insurance company does not want to
pay for it. The lack of societal consensus over when, if ever, a
patient should be entitled to receive health care is reflected by
the absence of clear legislation orjudicial precedent recognizing
such rights.
A. The Right of Informed Consent
Throughout most of the history of medicine, the doctor-
patient relationship has been founded on the ethics of benefi-
cence, or paternalism.47 The doctor decided what was best for
the patient, and the patient accepted the decision, usually with-
out questioning, understanding, or perhaps even a real choice.
The doctor was guided in his decision by another related ethical
principle, namely non-maleficence, which required him to
"above all, do no harm" to the patient.
46. See infra notes 75-83 and accompanying text. This legal power/ethical
pitfall problem is later explored in the context of business ethics. See infra notes
150-54 (discussing corporate compliance programs).
47. See RUTH R. FADEN ET AL., A HISTORY AND THEORY OF INFORMED CON-
SENT 9-10, 61-76 (1986). "[B]efore the mid-twentieth century, the beneficence
model... was the only operative model of the physician's responsibility to the
patient." Id. at 100-01. For an exhaustive account of the four-principles (auton-
omy, beneficence, non-maleficence, and justice) approach to medical ethics,
see RAANAN GILLON, PRINCIPLES OF HEALTH CARE ETHICS pt. 1 (1994).
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These two principles of beneficence and non-maleficence
formed the ethical bedrock of the doctor-patient relationship
until relatively recently.48 Paternalism in medicine was grounded
in ethics, and it reflected a social consensus, for most of history
and still in many other countries, about what was ethically appro-
priate behavior between doctors and patients. Doing the right
thing for the patient entailed doing what doctors thought was the
best thing for the patient: what would benefit her, and above all
not harm her. The ethical principle of autonomy, or respect for
individual self-determination, played a minor role in the doctor-
patient relationship, and was reflected in the doctor's obtaining
the patient's consent before treatment.49 It did not matter that
the patient's expression of consent may have been pretty general,
such as simply 'Yes," or "OK," or "Sure, doctor, whatever you
say," or even the failure to say "No." Ethics required at least a
minimalist expression of autonomy, and law backed ethics up.
Since the early part of this century, the law has expressed soci-
ety's view that it was wrong-a violation of autonomy-to treat
the patient without some kind of consent. The law expressed
this ethical view by allowing the patient to sue her doctor for
common-law battery if the doctor treated her without prior
consent.
50
48. See FADEN ET AL., supra note 47, at 86-91 (suggesting that the late
1950s and early 1960s marked the beginning of change from a beneficence
model to an autonomy model in informed consent theory).
49. See id. at 100 ("Informed consent did not become an issue in
medicine until the twentieth century, although we have seen evidence of con-
sent-seeking and the respecting of patient refusals in the nineteenth century.").
See alsoJAY KATZ, THE SILENT WORLD OF DOCTOR AND PATIENT 4, 49-50 (1986):
The history of the physician-patient relationship from ancient times to
the present . . .bears testimony to physicians' inattention to their
patients' fight and need to make their own decisions.... [Although]
consent to surgical interventions is an ancient legal requirement ....
[such consent was not meaningful consent] because there was no
right for patients to decide, after having been properly informed,
whether an intervention was agreeable to them in light of its risks and
benefits as well as available alternatives.
50. See, e.g., Schloendorff v. Soc'y of N.Y. Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y.
1914) (Cardozo, J.) ("Every human being of adult years and sound mind has a
right to determine what shall be done with his own body; and a surgeon who
performs an operation without his patient's consent commits an assault, for
which he is liable in damages."). See also Harris v. Leader, 499 S.E.2d 374 (Ga.
Ct. App. 1998):
[T] he relationship of doctor and patient is a consensual one, and any
unauthorized and unprivileged contact by a doctor with his patient in
examination, treatment or surgery would amount to a battery. In the
interest of one's general right of inviolability of his person, any unlaw-
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With the advent of the civil rights movement in the second
half of this century, Americans' views began to undergo substan-
tial change concerning the rights of individuals in relation to
government and in relation to other individuals or institutions
who were more politically, socially, or economically powerful.
Not surprisingly, about this time, societal views concerning the
patient's role in the doctor-patient relationship also began to
change.5 Patients began to voice the ethical proposition,
founded on the autonomy principle, that they, rather than the
doctors, should have the ultimate authority to decide the course
of their medical treatment. Patients asserted this ethical view,
not by writing philosophy dissertations in universities or passion-
ate editorials in newspapers, but by taking their doctors to court.
Throughout the 1970s and 1980s in state courts and legislatures
across the country, patients began claiming that doctors had an
ethical obligation, not just to get them to agree to treatment, but
to talk to them in more depth about the nature and the risks of
proposed medical treatment before providing it.5 2 In other
words, they argued that doctors had an ethical duty to get more
than just bare consent; they ought to get the patient's informed
consent prior to treatment.
Courts began to side with patients in this ethical debate by
allowing patients to sue a doctor, notjust for battery, but also for
medical malpractice if the doctor failed to disclose, prior to treat-
ment, certain significant information about the proposed treat-
ment which could affect the patient's decision to accept or reject
it. Starting from the ethical premise that patients ought to be
able to decide which treatments were in their best interest, courts
reasoned that patients needed to know a lot about a proposed
ful touching of that type is a physical injury to the person and is
actionable.
In Georgia, for example, a patient may still have a cause of action for battery
when the surgeon exceeds the scope of the patient's consent, see, e.g., Johnson
v. Srivastava, 405 S.E.2d 725 (Ga. Ct. App. 1991) (holding battery claim was
appropriate where patient alleged that she had consented only to an "excision
biopsy" whereas physician had performed a complete excision of a mass on her
face without first obtaining a biopsy), or obtained the patient's consent by
fraudulent misrepresentations, see, e.g., Lloyd v. Kramer, 503 S.E.2d 632 (Ga. Ct.
App. 1998) (where the patient was allowed to sue a podiatrist for, among other
things, battery based on allegations that he obtained patient's consent to
unnecessary and inappropriate hammer toe surgery through fraudulent
misrepresentations).
51. See FADEN ET AL., supra note 47, at 93-95, 101 (" [The American Hospi-
tal Association's 1972] Patient's Bill of Rights was connected to various con-
sumer and civil-rights movements that were everywhere demanding increased
rights to make free and informed decisions.").
52. See generally id. at 114-50.
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treatment before they could reasonably decide whether it was in
their best interests to have it. The courts therefore ruled that
doctors were required to disclose information which they knew
about the treatment, and which patients would find significant in
deciding whether to accept it, such as the material risks associ-
ated with it, its likelihood of success, its alternatives, and the
patient's prognosis without it.5" In some states, like Georgia,
where the courts did not reflect this ethical view in their com-
mon law, the state legislatures enacted informed consent statutes
which did so," and many states have replaced their common-law
developments with legislative enactments on informed consent.5"
Informed consent doctrine thus reflects an ethical shift away
from professional paternalism (doing what in the doctor's view was
in the patient's best interest) and toward individual autonomy
(letting the patient decide, once fully informed, what was best).
In effect, the widespread adoption of informed consent laws
reflects a societal consensus that in medical ethics at the bedside,
the principle of autonomy ought to prevail, in a case of conflict,
over the principle of beneficence. Patients were arguing that it
was ethically appropriate for doctors to talk in depth about the
medical care they proposed, even though such conversations
were largely foreign to the ethical perspective of the medical pro-
fession.56 Law was the vehicle by which the ethics of patient self-
determination and shared decision-making in the doctor-patient
53. See, e.g., Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Cobbs v.
Grant, 502 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1972).
54. Georgia was one of the last states to adopt a legal duty of informed
consent, which it enacted in a limited form by statute in 1989. Before 1989,
numerous cases in Georgia established that once a doctor had informed a
patient in general terms of the treatment or course of treatment proposed for
the patient, the doctor had no further duty to disclose the risks of treatment.
See Padgett v. Ferrier, 323 S.E.2d 166 (Ga. Ct. App. 1985) (and citations
therein). Under the 1989 amendment to Georgia's Medical Consent Law, spe-
cific disclosures were required to be made to the patient, including (a) diagno-
sis of patient's condition; (b) nature and purpose of proposed procedure; (c)
material risks of the procedure; (d) likelihood of success; (e) practical and gen-
erally recognized alternatives; and (f) patient's prognosis without the proce-
dure. See GA. CODE ANN. § 31-9-6.1 (1996).
55. See FADEN ET AL., supra note 47, at 139 (by 1982, thirty states had
replaced common-law developments in informed consent with statutes on
informed consent).
56. To put it bluntly, these legal developments in informed consent
caused medicine to be "jolted from an exclusive preoccupation with a benefi-
cence model to awareness of an autonomy model of responsibility for the
patient." Id. at 142. See also KA-rz, supra note 49, at 1 ("disclosure and consent,
except in the most rudimentary fashion, are obligations alien to medical think-
ing and practice").
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relationship were introduced to the medical profession.57 As a
profession, doctors may not have readily agreed that they had an
ethical duty to engage in these conversations with patients.5"
Understandably, they have resented both the lawsuits and the
resulting laws. Those laws do reflect, however, a societal consen-
sus that it was ethically wrong not to engage in these conversa-
tions with patients. Actions for battery and malpractice were
simply the ways that the law packed ethics with a punch.
B. The Right to Refuse Medical Treatment
Issues in medical ethics at the bedside also arise when a
patient wants to refuse treatment that her doctors believe is in
her best interests. A right to refuse treatment would seem to be a
natural corollary of the right to consent to it. What now are the
ethical responsibilities in the doctor-patient relationship? In the
name of autonomy, should, for example, a patient be allowed to
refuse CPR in the event of cardiac arrest, or to refuse a blood
transfusion in an emergency, or to forego other life-extending
treatments, whether they be ordinary or heroic measures? Or in
the ethical interests of beneficence or non-maleficence, should
doctors be able to provide the treatment to save the patient's life,
even over her or her surrogate's objections?
1. Incompetent Patients
The first court case to address this question involved Karen
Ann Quinlan, a victim of a tragic accident that left her in a persis-
tent vegetative state with no possibility of recovery.59 After many
57. See ANNAS, supra note 35, at 3 ("Law sides with patients to oppose the
arbitrary use of power whether by physicians or the government; the rubric is
patient rights. This is why American law, not philosophy or medicine, is primar-
ily responsible for the agenda, development and current state of American
bioethics."); FADEN ET AL., supra note 47, at 101:
Amid the convergence of complicated social causes and reasons that
may never be properly sifted by historians, it was case law that intro-
duced the concept of informed consent to medicine in the mid-twenti-
eth century using the language of "self-determination." Shortly
thereafter, informed consent was transformed in a social context
beyond law from a malpractice issue to a moral duty incumbent on
physicians, one straightforwardly linked to the principle of respect for
autonomy.
58. See Carl E. Schneider, Making Sausage: The Ninth Circuit's Opinion, HS-
TINGS CENTER REP., Jan.-Feb. 1997, at 28 ("[T]he history of bioethics is in no
small part a reaction to the sobering number of doctors who have not been
driven to understand patients' wishes, who have not understood them, and who
have ignored them even when they have understood them.").
59. See In re Karen Ann Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647 (N.J. 1976).
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years, Quinlan's father finally asked to have his unconscious
daughter disconnected from the ventilator, in the belief that she
would not have wished to have been kept alive by such measures
in a state of permanent unconsciousness. With the support of his
church, the father believed that it was morally right to stop pro-
viding this form of treatment. The doctors, to the contrary,
thought it was ethically wrong to disconnect any living patient
from a ventilator.6 ° What, ethically, should be done? In a
thoughtful opinion reflecting both ethical and legal precedent,
the court ruled in favor of the father's authority-rather than the
doctors'-to make the decisions about his daughter's medical
treatment on her behalf in light of what she would have wanted
done under the circumstances.
The case was controversial. Over the next three decades,
state courts across the country considered dozens of cases just
like it. The courts have fairly consistently upheld the ethical bal-
ance struck in Quinlan's case, and have ruled that it is the
patient's right (or a surrogate's right on the patient's behalf if
the patient is incompetent) to accept or to refuse medical treat-
ment.6" Whether these court cases have changed social opinion,
or whether changes in social opinion are being reflected in these
cases, 6 2 gradually a social consensus has emerged that patients
(or their surrogates)-rather than doctors-ought to decide ulti-
mately how much and what kind of care they should have at the
end of life.
When the United States Supreme Court in 1990 recognized
under federal Constitutional law that an individual has a liberty
interest in refusing unwanted medical treatment,63 the Court was
60. See id. at 655 ("it seemed to be the consensus not only of the treating
physicians but also of the several qualified experts who testified in the case, that
removal from the respirator would not conform to medical practices, standards,
and traditions"). Twenty years later, many doctors are now taking the contrary
ethical position, and are urging that medical ethics allows (and maybe obliges)
doctors to remove a permanently unconscious patient like Quinlan from life
support they deem to be futile, even if the patient's surrogate objects to its
removal. See infra note 85.
61. See generally FURROW ET AL., supra note 9, at 403-16 (collecting cases
and discussing potential civil liability for providers' failure to recognize
patient's or surrogate's decision to forego life-sustaining treatment). In a
recent case in Texas, parents who had decided against having doctors resusci-
tate their infant born prematurely at 22 weeks gestation won a $42.9 million
verdict for doctors having resuscitated the infant against parents' wishes. See
Jury Returns $42.9 Million Verdict in Case of Brain-Damaged Baby, 7 HEALTH LAW
REP. (BNA) 183 (Jan. 29, 1998).
62. See supra notes 4, 36.
63. See Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
The Court characterized this case as "the first case in which we have been
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reflecting this emerging current societal consensus that individu-
als should have the "right to die with dignity," and that it is wrong
to extend life or prolong dying against the patient's wishes. Over
the past few decades, all state legislatures have also backed up
this ethical viewpoint with legislation recognizing the right of
patients to express their wishes, and to have them honored,
through advance directives like living wills or durable powers of
attorney. 64 Even the federal government in 1991 addressed
patients' rights with legislation pointedly called the Patient Self-
Determination Act,65 requiring hospitals to inform patients
about their rights under state law to consent to or refuse medical
treatment and to express their wishes in advance directives.
2. Competent Patients
The law has also been asked to resolve ethical conflicts at the
bedside of patients who are not terminally ill or comatose or in
the process of dying. What ought to happen when patients have,
potentially, many years of healthy life ahead of them if they are
given certain medical treatment? Ethically, in the interest of
autonomy, should they be allowed to refuse it, when that deci-
sion will likely result in declining health or even death? Or, in
the interests of beneficence and non-maleficence, should doctors
be allowed to provide the care to improve a patient's health or
even save her life, over her objections? Patients and doctors
again took these ethical questions to the courts for resolution. In
deciding these cases, courts have expressly considered a variety of
ethical principles and concerns that compete with the ethical
principle of autonomy. In the courts' view, a person's interest in
autonomy and control over his body is not absolute, but must be
carefully balanced against the ethical interests of the community
at large (the state) and of the medical profession in particular.
66
squarely presented with the issue of whether the United States Constitution
grants what is in common parlance referred to as a 'right to die."' Id. at 277.
The Court assumed, for the purposes of the case, "the United States Constitu-
tion would grant a competent person a constitutionally protected right to
refuse lifesaving hydration and nutrition." Id. at 279.
64. See NATIONAL SURVEY OF STATE LAws 441-96 (Richard A. Leiter ed., 2d
ed. 1997) (identifying forty-nine states' legislation concerning advance direc-
tives). Since publication of this volume, the fiftieth state, Alabama, has
amended its statute to provide for durable powers of attorney for health care.
See ALA. CODE § 26-1-2 (1998).
65. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395cc, 1396a (1992).
66. While the courts have not framed their analysis in the terms of the
conventional four principles of medical ethics (autonomy, beneficence, non-
maleficence, and justice, see supra note 47, they have adopted an analytical,
four-factor framework that parallels closely those principles. The four counter-
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The state courts across the country have almost uniformly
sided with patients in this ethical debate. Courts have generally
ruled that mentally competent adults have the legal right to
refuse any and all medical treatment, even to the point of death.
So, for example, a Jehovah's Witness may refuse a life-saving
blood transfusion," even if she is a parent whose refusal could
leave her children orphaned and without parental support.68 A
person with disabilities or serious illnesses, such as quadriplegia,
may decline life-saving medical treatment, nutrition, and hydra-
tion.' 9 Even state prison inmates may refuse food and medical
care to the point of death in some cases.7" Generally speaking,
however, courts have weighed this ethical balance against the
patient (and allowed doctors to provide treatment over the
patient's objection) only when the patient was a minor, 71 or
when the patient's refusal of medical treatment might adversely
affect the wellbeing of a minor 72 or a fetus. 73 Even in these
vailing "state interests" which courts have identified as important to balance
against the patient's (autonomy) interest in refusing medical treatment are: (1)
preserving life, (2) preventing suicide, (3) protecting the ethical integrity of the
medical profession, and (4) protecting the interests of innocent third parties.
See, e.g., Bartling v. Super. Ct., 209 Cal. Rptr. 220 (Ct. App. 2d 1984); State v.
McAfee, 385 S.E.2d 651 (Ga. 1989); Superintendent of Belchertown State Sch.
v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417 (Mass. 1977).
67. See, e.g., Norwood Hosp. v. Munoz, 564 N.E.2d 1017 (Mass. 1991); Fos-
mire v. Nicoleau, 551 N.E.2d 77 (N.Y. 1990).
68. See, e.g., Stamford Hosp. v. Vega, 674 A.2d 821 (Conn. 1996); In re
Dubreuil, 629 So. 2d 819 (Fla. 1993).
69. See, e.g., Bouvia v. Super. Ct., 225 Cal. Rptr. 297 (Ct. App. 2d Dist.
1986) (quadriplegic); Satz v. Perlmutter, 362 So. 2d 160 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1978) (Lou Gehrig's disease); State v. McAfee, 385 S.E.2d 651 (Ga. 1989)
(quadriplegic).
70. See, e.g., Thor v. Super. Ct., 855 P.2d 375 (Cal. 1993); Zant v. Prevatte,
286 S.E.2d 715 (Ga. 1982). But see Schuetzle v. Vogel, 537 N.W.2d 358 (N.D.
1995) (holding that the state's interest in orderly prison administration out-
weighs a prisoner's right to refuse treatment, and specifically stating that "[w] e,
like every court that has considered Zant, refuse to follow it"). In the case of
federal prisoners, courts have upheld the prison's force-feeding of inmates, cit-
ing either constitutional bases, see, e.g., In reJohn Doe, 150 F.3d 170 (2d Cir.
1998) (stating that the state's interests in preserving life and orderly prison
administration outweigh the prisoner's right to refuse treatment), or Bureau of
Prisons Regulation, see, e.g., Martinez v. Turner, 977 F.2d 421, 423 (8th Cir.
1992). See also 28 C.F.R. § 549.65 (1994) (authorizing force-feeding after medi-
cal evaluation).
71. See, e.g., Novak v. Cobb County-Kennestone Hosp. Auth., 849 F. Supp.
1559 (N.D. Ga. 1994), affd, 74 F.3d 1173 (lth Cir. 1996) (holding that a
mature minor" does not have the right to refuse medical treatment under the
U.S. Constitution or Georgia law).
72. See, e.g., Application of the Pres. & Dirs. of Georgetown College, Inc.,
331 F.2d 1000 (D.C. Cir. 1964) (ordering blood transfusion of Jehovah's Wit-
ness mother of infant child).
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cases, some courts have ruled that the patient may refuse the
treatment.
7 4
C. Patients' Rights and the Legal Power/Ethical Pitfall Problem
Do these legal developments in informed consent and
refusal of medical treatment reflect societal consensus? This
essay argues that, at least in theory, in giving primacy to the ethi-
cal principle of autonomy in the doctor-patient relationship, the
courts and legislatures have reflected, or perhaps forged in some
cases, a societal consensus that patients ought to have more deci-
sion-making power in that relationship. By societal "consensus,"
again it is not suggested that, as a practical matter, everyone in
society agrees that the ethically correct resolution has been
reached in these cases.7 5 In reality, plenty of people disagree.
On ethical issues involving life and death, there are bound to be
sharp differences of opinions. While many patients, and many
who see themselves as future patients, may have come to believe
that they ought to be allowed to steer the course of the health
care they receive, and while the courts and legislatures may have
agreed with them, the medical profession has been slower to
embrace the ethics of patient autonomy at the bedside. So, for
example, in the case of patients' rights to refuse medical treat-
ment, numerous studies and litigation have shown that despite
court rulings, living wills, durable powers of attorney, and so
forth, many doctors continue to provide treatment at the bedside
without the consent or even over the objections of patients or
their families.76
73. See, e.g., Jefferson v. Griffin Spalding County Hosp. Auth., 274 S.E.2d
457 (Ga. 1981) (holding the state may intervene on behalf of fetus and require
pregnant woman to have cesarean section surgery).
74. Some courts have held that a competent pregnant woman has the
right to refuse cesarean section surgery, even when such refusal may threaten
the welfare of her fetus. See, e.g., In reA.C., 573 A.2d 1235 (D.C. 1990); In re
Baby Boy Doe, 632 N.E.2d 326 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994) (recognizing right of
refusal). One recent decision permitted a pregnant woman to refuse less inva-
sive medical care-a blood transfusion-which doctors had recommended for
the welfare of her fetus. See In reBrown, 689 N.E.2d 397 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997). See
generally Charity Scott, Resisting the Temptation to Turn Medical Recommendations
into Judicial Orders: A Reconsideration of Court-Ordered Surgery for Pregnant Women,
10 GA. ST. U. L. Riv. 615 (1994).
75. See supra notes 4, 36 and accompanying text.
76. See, e.g., David A. Asch et al., Decisions to Limit Life-Sustaining Treatment
By Critical Care Physicians in the United States: Conflicts Between Physicians' Practices
and Patients' Wishes, 151 AM. J. RESPIR. CARE MED. 288, 288-92 (1995) (one-third
of surveyed physicians continued life-sustaining measures despite patient or sur-
rogate wishes that it be discontinued); Kapp, supra note 45, at 524-37 (providing
examples of medically inappropriate treatment near the end of life as a result
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Understandably, doctors resent the intrusion of law at the
bedside. Law came to the patients' bedside, however, because
there was an emerging societal sense that wrong was being done
to the patients there. This invitation to get the law involved in
ethical conflicts is nothing new. Whenever there is a social sense
of wrong, or injustice, or an abuse of power by some people or
some institutions (including government), those who feel abused
often turn to the law for protection.7 7 In this case, a felt need for
patient protection from a power imbalance in the doctor-patient
relationship has resulted in consent forms, living wills, and other
legal documents and rules. That these legal mechanisms fre-
quently provide only minimal protection in practice-that they
often fail to achieve the ethical balance that was their goal-does
not alter the point that their purpose was to promote an ethical
vision of the doctor-patient relationship.
Although informed consent doctrine is founded on ethical
ideals of respect for persons, patient autonomy, and self-determi-
nation, as well as ideals of shared decision-making and genuine
collaboration between physician and patient, actual practice in
the relations between patients and providers is often different.
On the floor of so many hospitals and doctors' offices, informed
consent doctrine moves from the sublime to the ridiculous: from
an active and constructive conversation to a multi-page, incom-
prehensible consent document, from facilitating a dialogue to
of physicians' fears of legal liability); Philip G. Peters, Jr., The Illusion of Auton-
omy at the End of Life: Unconsented Life Support and the Wrongful Life Analogy, 45
UCLA L. REv. 673 (1998) (citing numerous studies which suggest that physi-
cians routinely ignore patient preferences about life-sustaining care); SUP-
PORT Principal Investigators, A Controlled Trial to Improve Care for Seriously Ill
Hospitalized Patients: The Study to Understand Prognoses and Preferences for Outcomes
and Risks of Treatments, 274JAMA 1591, 1591-98 (1995) (reporting findings of a
large study that many physicians were unaware of or ignored their patients'
preferences concerning CPR, and that terminally ill patients were hooked up to
mechanical ventilation despite their preferences, and were dying in pain).
There are a number of cases where allegedly unwanted care was provided
despite the presence of a patient's advance directive. See, e.g., Roberts v. Jones,
475 S.E.2d 193 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996); Allore v. Flower Hosp., 699 N.E.2d 560
(Ohio Ct. App. 1997). See also FuRROW ET AL., supra note 9 (discussing potential
civil liability for failure to respect patient's decision); Peters, supra (arguing that
liability should be imposed on a physician who wrongfully administers life-sus-
taining care over the objection of the patient or surrogate); Tamar Lewin, Ignor-
ing "Right to Die, "Medical Community Is Being Sued, N. Y. TIMES, June 2, 1996, at I
("there is a new wave of lawsuits seeking to hold hospitals, nursing homes and
doctors liable for ignoring living wills and other advance directives").
77. See ANNAS, supra note 35, at 3 ("American law, especially civil rights
law, is dedicated to fostering individual rights, equality and justice. Law sides
with patients to oppose the arbitrary use of power whether by physicians or the
government; the rubric is patients' rights.").
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getting a signature for the files. And who is to blame? One may
be tempted to say "the law," or at least "the lawyers."
And to some extent that is true. After all, the law said it was
important to have these conversations, and backed that ethical
proposition up with the punch of liability for malpractice if the
doctor or hospital did not have them. Moreover, most legislation
on informed consent provides explicit directions for avoiding
law's punch: get it in writing. Georgia's informed consent law,
for example, like many state statutes, provides that if one follows
the instructions and gets the patient's signature on a consent
form that is filled out according to statutory specifications, then
the patient's consent will be legally presumed to be valid.7" The
bottom line: if you get the signature on a form like this one, then
you won't get sued ("punched").
And herein lies the pitfall which the very power of the law
creates for ethical reflection. That bottom line is near the bot-
tom of ethical practice. As argued earlier, ° law only sets a floor
for ethical behavior. At the very minimum, the law needs to be
satisfied that the patient at least had the opportunity to be
informed about her diagnosis, the risks of treatment, her alterna-
tives, and so forth. The law does not require proof, beyond these
minimums, that the patient actually understood any of the infor-
mation she was given, or engaged in any genuine conversation
with her health care providers before accepting treatment, or
made truly autonomous choices about her health care. Faced
with the power of law, however, we tend to get stuck in our ethi-
cal reflections at the ground floor.81
As is so often true when law packs ethics with a punch, peo-
ple tend to over-focus on avoiding the punch, and not on the
78. See 1 FURROW ET AL., supra note 9, at 439 ("A consent form, or other
written documentation of the patient's verbal consent, is treated in many states
as presumptively valid consent to the treatment at issue, with the burden on the
patient to rebut the presumption."). See also infra note 79.
79. Actually, you can still get sued, but you have increased your chances
of defending a malpractice suit successfully. In Georgia, for example, for surgi-
cal or diagnostic treatment involving anesthesia, amniocentesis, or injection of
contrast material, if the consent form discloses in writing certain specific mat-
ters-diagnosis, material risks, likelihood of success, and alternatives-and is
signed by the patient, then it is rebuttably presumed to be valid consent. See GA.
CODE ANN. § 31-9-6.1(a), (b) (2) (1996). For all other treatment, if the consent
form discloses in general terms the course of treatment and is signed and in
writing, then it is conclusively presumed to be valid consent in the absence of
fraud. See id. at § 31-9-6(d).
80. See supra notes 37-40 and accompanying text.
81. See generally Kapp, supra note 45, at 524-37, 544-46 (discussing how
physicians' misunderstandings of the law can lead to medically inappropriate
and ethically dubious treatment of critically ill and dying patients).
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ethical underpinnings of the law. We get so obsessed about these
forms that we forget that they were designed to facilitate conver-
sation, not to be a substitute for it. We forget that they were
intended to begin the conversations with patients, not to end
them. Forgetting the ethical ideals, we do not ask: did we have a
real talk with the patient, did the patient understand, does the
patient really know and accept what she is getting into? We
worry only about legal compliance, and ask instead: did you get
the consent, by which we mean, did you get the signature? So
often before surgery one hears practitioners ask: "Did anybody go
consent the patient?" Now a transitive verb, "consent" is some-
thing that is done to the patient, not something that the patient
does.
In reality, the law has done little to move actual medical
practice closer to the ideal of shared decision-making between
physician and patient." Too often, law has been used only to
cover the doctor-patient relationship with bureaucratic red
tape.83 But it is not really the law's fault that ethical ideals have
not been achieved in medical practice. Health care providers are
the ones who can choose whether or not they want to go beyond
82. See FADEN ET AL., supra note 47, at 100:
Katz seems right in his thesis that informed consent has not changed
the fundamental character of the physician-patient relationship....
The beneficence model is [still] overwhelmingly predominant.
Patients routinely acquiesce to medical interventions rather than
autonomously authorizing them. From this perspective all the
changes [over the past century] are surface displays, while below the
surface there are no more real 'informed consents' than in the past.
See also Bruce V. Corsino, Bioethics Committees and JCAHO Patients' Rights Stan-
dards: A Question of Balance, 7J. CU. ETHICS 177, 179 (1996) (describing prov-
iders' experiences with informed consent and advance directives as "unhelpful,
non-medical procedures"); Alan Meisel & Mark Kucsewski, Legal and Ethical
Myths About Informed Consent, 156 ARCH. INT. MED. 2521 (1996) (attributing phy-
sicians' negative reactions to informed consent to fundamental misunderstand-
ings about what informed consent requires); Informed Consent-Not, Sci. NEWS,
July 4, 1998, at 15 (reporting on two studies which raise questions about the
utility of informed consent forms as an aid to patient decision-making).
83. See 1 FuRRow ET AL., supra note 9, at 439-41:
These forms operate as a legal surrogate for consent, sometimes
memorializing an actual physician-patient discussion, sometimes act-
ing simply as a fiction. . . . Written consent forms predominate in
institutional settings, given bureaucratic pressures for a complete
patient record, a desire to protect against litigation, and a sense that
something is better than nothing. They are often reduced to little
more than a bureaucratic formality that the institution hopes will erect
a defense shield against malpractice liability.
See also John Lantos, Informed Consent: The Whole Truth for Patients?, 72 CANCER
2811, 2813 (Supp. 1993) ("Informed consent forms become waivers of
liability.").
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law's minimums and strive for the ethical maximums. They can
choose to start and end conversations with their patients with the
informed consent form. Or they can choose to go beyond the
form and begin to engage the patient in thinking about her
health and the ways she thinks would best promote it, to allay her
fears and to give her confidence in her choices. Law never took
it out of the hands of the health care professionals to strive for
the ethical high ground.
D. The Right to Receive Medical Treatment
While social consensus has been evolving, at least in ethical
and legal theory, over patients' rights to consent to and refuse
medical treatment, there is much less social accord on more
recently emerging ethical questions involving patients' rights to
receive medical treatment. We have never agreed in our society
that, ethically, every person who needs medical treatment ought
to be able to get it. Not surprisingly, we have no law that requires
universal health care coverage. Occasionally, we do agree that
some people ought to be able to get some kinds of medical treat-
ment some of the time. For example, the federal law mentioned
earlier, which requires hospitals to treat emergency patients and
women in labor, reflects the social agreement that these patients
ought to be able to get emergency care regardless of their ability
to pay for it.84 The federal Medicaid and Medicare programs
also reflect social accord that some people should be able to get
some treatment at least some of the time, regardless of their abil-
ity to pay.
Generally speaking, however, we have not yet found consen-
sus on a range of ethical questions involving when, if ever,
patients ought to be entitled to receive medical treatment that
someone else either does not want to provide, or does not want
to pay for, or thinks that patients should not get. For example,
we have not yet agreed on whether a patient who is severely phys-
ically and mentally disabled, such as permanently unconscious,
ought to be able to get medical treatment which her doctors do
not want to provide because they say it is futile, or her condition
is too hopeless.8 5 We have not yet agreed on whether patients
84. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (1992). See also supra notes 15-16 and accom-
panying text.
85. Unilateral efforts by physicians to terminate life-sustaining treatment
they consider futile for a patient over the objections of the patient or the
patient's family have generated public controversy and litigation. In the case of
Helga Wanglie, a medical center unsuccessfully sought to replace the patient's
husband as her guardian when he refused to consent to the removal of her
respirator, which treatment the doctors regarded as inappropriate and "non-
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with advanced breast cancer ought to be able to get expensive
high-tech treatment which their insurance companies do not
want to pay for because the insurance companies say it is experi-
mental and unproven treatment." And we are still deciding
whether a patient ought to be able to get a physician to help her
commit suicide if she is terminally ill and wishes to die.87
beneficial" in light of the patient's persistent vegetative state. See Marcia Angell,
The Case of Helga Wanglie: A New Kind of "Right to Die", 325 NEW ENG. J. MED. 511
(1991); Steven H. Miles, Informed Demand for "Non-Beneficial" Medical Treatment,
325 NEW ENG. J. MED. 512 (1991). In the case of Catherine Gilgunn, a jury
found doctors and a hospital not liable for withdrawing ventilator support from
a comatose and severely brain-damaged patient whose daughter had objected
to the withdrawal and insisted that her mother would have wanted the aggres-
sive treatment. See Alexander Morgan Capron, Abandoning a Life, HASTINGS
CENTER REP., July-Aug. 1995, at 24; Gina Kolata, Court Ruling Limits Rights of
Patients, N. Y. TIMES, Apr. 22, 1995, at A6. See also Velez v. Bethune, 466 S.E.2d
627 (Ga. Ct. App. 1995) (denying a motion to dismiss, court observed that doc-
tor "had no right to decide, unilaterally, to discontinue medical treatment even
if, as the record in this case reflects, the child was terminally ill and in the
process of dying. That decision must be made with the consent of the par-
ents."); infra note 88.
86. Public debate over who decides what health plans and insurance com-
panies should pay for continues amid controversial damage awards and "horror
stories" after some payers have denied coverage for treatments they consider
unproven, experimental, or not medically necessary. See, e.g., Christine
Gorman et al., Playing the HMO Game: Denied Viagra and Inflamed by Horror Stories,
Consumers Put Health Reform Back on the Front Burner, TIME, July 13, 1998, at 22
(describing numerous cases of denied coverage); Tom Hamburger, Clinton
Presses for Patients'Bill of Rights: An Apple Valley Woman Relates Her HMO Trouble,
MINNEAPOLIS-ST. PAUL STAR TRIB., May 29, 1998, at 10A (stating that President
Clinton urged Congress to pass a patients' bill of rights, citing example of
woman with breast cancer denied chemotherapy by her HMO); Ron Winslow &
Rhonda L. Rundle, Aetna Reels in Wake of $116 Million Damages Verdict, WALL ST.
J.,Jan. 22, 1999, at B4 (describing large jury awards for denials of bone-marrow
transplant coverage in the cases of Teresa Goodrich's husband, who died of
stomach cancer, and Nelene Fox, who had breast cancer). Even studies
designed to determine the efficacy of costly new medical treatments seem
unlikely to quell the public debate over whether they should be covered by
health payers. See Nancy Ann Jeffrey & Michael Waldholz, Studies Are Likely to
Question Breast Cancer Therapy, WALL ST.J., Mar. 24, 1999, at Bi (noting that four
landmark studies of aggressive chemotherapy-transplant treatment for breast
cancer "are likely to spark a firestorm of controversy"); infra note 89.
87. The moral and social debate over the ethics of physicians collaborat-
ing with patients to hasten their deaths continues both inside and outside court-
rooms and legislatures. Jack Kevorkian of Michigan has given high visibility to
the public debate over physician-assisted suicide, which will probably not be
diminished by his March 1999 conviction of second-degree murder for adminis-
tering a lethal injection to a man with Lou Gehrig's disease. See Sue Ellen
Christian, Opponents Fear Making Martyr of Kevorkian; Conviction Leaves Debate
Unfinished, CHICAGO TRIB., Mar. 28, 1999, at 3. Having assisted in the deaths of
approximately 130 persons since 1990, Kevorkian had been unsuccessfully pros-
ecuted four times before for his role in providing suicide assistance. SeeJulie
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These ethical dilemmas may initially arise at the bedside, but
their ethical implications extend well beyond the doctor-patient
relationship and affect the broader community. That we are still
in the process of finding a social consensus on these questions is
reflected, variously, by our lack of laws directly addressing an
issue, such as futile treatment; 88 or by extensive litigation result-
Grace, Curtains for Dr. Death, TIME, Apr. 5, 1999, at 48. There is also evidence
that medical and nursing professionals have assisted in the suicides of their
patients. See, e.g., Ezekiel J. Emanuel et al., The Practice of Euthanasia and Physi-
cian-Assisted Suicide in the United States, 280 JAMA 507 (1998) (stating that
approximately fifteen percent of surveyed oncologists reported participating in
euthanasia or physician-assisted suicide); Lee R. Slome et al., Physician-Assisted
Suicide and Patients with Human Immunodeficiency Virus Disease, 336 NEW ENG. J.
MED. 417 (1997) (relating that a majority of San Francisco-area physicians car-
ing for HlV/AIDS patients who responded to the survey said they had granted
at least one patient's request for assisted suicide). Acknowledging that the med-
ical profession has historically failed to address serious deficiencies in the care
of dying patients, the AMA has undertaken a number of reform initiatives to
improve physicians' skills in the field of end-of-life care, as well as to educate
patients on the quality of care they should expect. See, e.g., Kathleen M. Foley,
Competent Care for the Dying Instead of Physician-Assisted Suicide, 336 NEW ENG. J.
MED. 54 (1997); Diane M. Gianelli, Assisted Suicide Case Consensus: We Need Better
End-of-Life Care, AM. MED. NEWS, Apr. 1997, at 1; Diane M. Gianelli, Report Says
Myths Dominate End-of-Life Care Debate, AM. MED. NEWS, May 19, 1997, at 8; Daniel
P. Sulmasy & Joanne Lynn, Contempo: End-of-Life Care, 277 JAMA 1854 (1997);
AMA Hosts Innovative Seminar Addressing End-of-Life Care, AM. MED. NEWS, Feb.
15, 1999, at 24; Warren E. Leary, Many in U.S. Denied Dignified Death: Health
Panel Asserts That Too Little Is Done to Ease End of Life Care, N.Y. TIMES, June 5,
1997, at A13; infra note 90.
88. For example, litigation under EMTALA has established the right of
an infant with anencephaly (i.e., without a brain) to receive life-saving medical
treatment in a hospital's emergency room, even though doctors believed that
such extraordinary measures were outside the medical standard of care and
that such treatment was both medically futile and ethically inappropriate to
render. See In re Baby K, 16 F.3d 590 (4th Cir. 1994); but cf Bryan v. Rectors &
Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 95 F.3d 349 (4th Cir. 1996) (holding that EMTALA
did not require doctors to continue treating a woman who had been treated at
the hospital for 12 days for an emergency condition). While there are few laws
directly addressing the problem of futile treatment (Virginia is the only state
with a statute permitting doctors to withhold such care, but it was held to have
been preempted by EMTALA in the Baby K case), the literature on the topic of
medical futility is voluminous. For views that doctors should not be required
(ethically or legally) to render care they believe to be futile, see, for example,
Howard Brody, The Physician's Role in Determining Futility, 42 J. AM. GERIATRICS
Soc'y 875 (1994); John J. Paris & Frank E. Reardon, Physician Refusal of Requests
for Futile or Ineffective Interventions, 1 CAMBRIDGE Q. HEALTHCARE ETHICS 127
(1992); LawrenceJ. Schneiderman & Nancy S. Jecker, Is the Treatment Beneficial,
Experimental, or Futile?, 5 CAMBRIDGE Q. HEALTHCARE ETHICS 248 (1996). For
contrary views that doctors do have such an obligation, see, for example, Felicia
Ackerman, The Significance of a Wish, HASTINGS CENTER REP., July-Aug. 1991, at
27; Robert M. Veatch, Why Physicians Cannot Determine If Care Is Futile, 42 J. AM.
GERIATRICS Soc'v 871 (1994); Susan Wolf, Near Death-In the Moment of Decision,
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ing in conflicting court interpretations of existing laws, such as
with breast cancer treatment litigation;"9 or by the passionate
calls that there "ought be a law," such as there is over the issue of
physician-assisted suicide, causing litigation going all the way to
the Supreme Court and heated debates in a multitude of state
legislatures." ° To move in the direction of patients' rights to
322 NEw ENG.J. MED. 208 (1990). See generally Daniel Callahan, Medical Futility,
Medical Necessity: The-Problem-Without-A-Name, HASTINGS CENTER REP., July-Aug.
1991, at 30. For a recent recommendation that all hospitals develop a medical
futility policy, see AMA Council on Ethical &Jud. Affairs, MedicalFutility in End-
of-Life Care, 281 JAMA 937 (1999).
89. Insurers and employers have attempted to exclude, by the terms of
the health insurance policy, costly treatments which have not yet been scientifi-
cally proven to be beneficial or which they consider still experimental. A com-
mon area of litigation has been over high-dose chemotherapy with autologous
bone marrow transplant (HDC/ABMT) or with peripheral stem cell recovery
(HDC/PSCR) for advanced breast cancer. Courts have split in their interpreta-
tions of these contractual limitations. Some courts have construed such con-
tractual exclusions against the insurers by finding the policy language
ambiguous, thus finding that the patients were entitled to coverage. See, e.g.,
Bailey v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Va., 67 F.3d 53 (4th Cir. 1995); Frendreis
v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Mich., 873 F. Supp. 1153 (N.D. Ill. 1995). Other
courts have held that the contractual exclusions unambiguously precluded cov-
erage. See, e.g., Bechtold v. Physicians Health Plan of N. Ind., 19 F.3d 322 (7th
Cir. 1994); Fuja v. Benefit Trust Life Ins. Co., 18 F.3d 1405 (7th Cir. 1994). See
generally John A. Bourdeau, Annotation, Propriety of Denial of Medical or Hospital
Benefits for Investigative, Educational, or Experimental Medical Procedures Pursuant to
Exclusion Contained in ERISA-Governed Health Plan, 122 A.L.R. Fed. 1 (1998) (in
§ 3, collecting cases involving denials of high-dose chemotherapy and autolo-
gous bone marrow transplant as treatment for breast cancer); Norman Daniels
& James E. Sabin, Last Chance Therapies and Managed Care: Pluralism, Fair Proce-
dures, and Legitimacy, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Mar.-Apr. 1998, at 27 (1998) (ana-
lyzing how health plans can make fair determinations about when to cover as-
yet unproven and costly treatments). Some litigation has been brought under
the anti-discrimination laws, raising the question whether a health plan's denial
of coverage for treatment of breast cancer by high-dose chemotherapy and
autologous bone marrow transplant (HDC/ABMT) on the grounds that treat-
ment was experimental constitutes discrimination under Americans with Disa-
bilities Act. See Henderson v. Bodine Aluminum, 70 F.3d 958 (8th Cir. 1995)
(arguably YES, remanding case to district court). See generally Laurie Dechery,
Note, Preferential Treatment or Discriminatory Standards: Do Employer-Provided Insur-
ance Plans Violate Title VII When They Exclude Treatment for Breast Cancer?, 80 MINN.
L. REv. 945 (1996) (arguing such policy exclusions constitute discrimination
under Title VII).
90. The U.S. Supreme Court has ruled that mentally competent, termi-
nally ill patients do not have a right protected by the federal constitution to
receive a physician's assistance in committing suicide by obtaining a prescrip-
tion of lethal drugs. See Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793 (1997) (finding no denial
of Equal Protection under 14th Amendment); Washington v. Glucksberg, 521
U.S. 702 (1997) (finding no liberty interest under Due Process Clause of 14th
Amendment). The issue of physician-assisted suicide has prompted legislative
activity at both the federal level, see, e.g., Federal Assisted Suicide Funding
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receive treatment inevitably entails a move beyond the bedside
and into the offices and boardrooms of health care providers
and payers. Any claim that patients have a right to receive a cer-
tain kind of medical care, or a certain quality of medical care,
inevitably raises the question, "Who's going to pay for it?" It is at
this point that the concerns of medical ethics begin to merge
with those of business ethics, to which this essay now turns.
III. ETHICS IN THE BOARDROOM: THE EVOLUTION OF
ORGANIZATION ETHICS AND CORPORATE HEALTH LAW
A. Everybody Is a Patient Advocate These Days
Although the medical profession may not have been among
the vanguard of patients' rights activists in the past, in the last few
years it has increasingly warmed to the role of patient advocate.91
Restriction Act, 42 U.S.C. § 14401 (Supp. 1997) (prohibiting use of federal
funds to subsidize physician-assisted suicide), and the state level. At least 37
states and territories have statutes which specifically ban assisted suicide. See
Stephanie Graboyes-Russo, Too Costly Too Live: The Moral Hazards of a Decision in
Washington v. Glucksberg and Vacco v. Quill, 51 U. MiAMI L. REv. 907, 912 n.29
(1997) (collecting statutes). In several other states, assisted suicide is illegal
under case law or negligent homicide statutes. See id. at 912-13 n.30 (citing laws
or cases in Alabama, Wyoming, North Carolina, South Carolina, Ohio, and Mas-
sachusetts). Under state statutes authorizing advance directives, such as living
wills or durable powers of attorney for health care, 45 States and the District of
Columbia expressly disapprove of assisted suicide or mercy killing. See Edward
R. Grant & Paul Benjamin Linton, Relief or Reproach: Euthanasia Rights in the
Wake of Measure 16, 74 OR. L. Rv. 449, 462-63 nn.44-46 (1995). With the excep-
tion of Oregon, discussed infra, no state expressly authorizes the practice of
assisted suicide. In addition, since 1994, proposals to legalize assisted suicide
have been introduced in at least seventeen different state legislatures, yet none
has been enacted. See Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 717 n.15. After two voter referen-
dums, Oregon has passed a law permitting physician assistance in hastening
death under certain circumstances. See OR. REv. STAT. § 127.800 (1996). For a
report on Oregon's experience with its new law, see Arthur E. Chin et al., Legal-
ized Physician-Assisted Suicide In Oregon-The First Year's Experience, 340 NEW. ENG.
J. MED. 577 (1999).
91. See Thrust into the Spotlight, Am. MED. NEws, Aug. 17, 1998, at 21. Dr.
E. Ratcliffe Anderson Jr., Executive Vice President of the AMA, characterized
the heart of the AMA's work as "doing what is right for patients," and he said
pushing for a federal patients' bill of rights was one of the highest AMA priori-
ties "that places everything else on the back burner." Id.; see also infra note 92.
This new campaign for adoption of a patients' bill of rights at the federal level
broadens the AMA's earlier efforts "for these patient protections in piecemeal
fashion-one issue at a time, often one state at a time." Thomas R. Reardon,
From the AMA Board Chair: AMA to Continue to Push for "Patient Bill of Rights", Am.
MED. NEWS, Dec. 22, 1997, at 17, 19. A primary focus of AMA advocacy will
continue to be patient protection. See The Big Picture, AM. MED. NEWS, Mar. 8,
1999. See also supra notes 23-31 (discussing federal proposals and state legisla-
tion for patients' bill of rights). It was not until 1996 that the editors at the
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And the medical profession is not alone. While it may have taken
many individual patient lawsuits and state-by-state legislative ini-
tiatives to establish patients' rights to consent to and to refuse
medical treatment over the past several decades, in the past few
years, many groups have come forward and made it their priority
to champion the rights of patients. "Patient protection acts" and
"patients' bills of rights" seem to have sprung up everywhere as
people seem keen to heed the rallying call of patients' rights. All
of a sudden, everybody is a patient advocate. In Congress, the
AMA has been waging a "battle for strong patient protection leg-
islation that will support our right as physicians to deliver medi-
cally appropriate care to our patients-and to support the rights
of our patients themselves." 2 The American Hospital Associa-
tion has revised its own Patient Bill of Rights. 3 The American
Association of Health Plans has added new patient protections to
its initiative called, "Putting Patients First." 4 One of the biggest
Journal of the American Medical Association announced the inauguration of a new
column in the journal devoted to "the patient-physician relationship," calling it
the "center of medicine" and urging physicians to "resist any compromises of
the trust this relationship requires." Richard M. Glass, The Patient-Physician Rela-
tionship: JAMA Focuses on the Center of Medicine, 275 JAMA 147 (1996). The first
featured article addressed to this now-central subject chronicled the history of
"patient-centered medicine." Christine Laine & Frank Davidoff, Patient-Centered
Medicine: A Professional Evolution, 275 JAMA 152 (1996).
92. Randolf D. Smoak, AMA Agenda for 1999: A Year of Opportunity, AM.
MED. NEWS, Jan. 4, 1999. This aggressive campaign in the name of patients'
rights continues the AMA's legislative lobbying efforts from 1998. See Aggressive
AMA Campaign Aimed at Correcting Abuses by Health Plans, Am. MED. NEWS, Aug. 3,
1998, at 21 [hereinafter Aggressive AMA]; AMA Advocates for a "Patients' Bill of
Rights", 280JAMA 310 (1998) [hereinafter AMA Advocates]. The AMA credits its
lobbying efforts as key in securing the recent passage in the House of a patients'
rights bill. See Linn Weiss & Catherine Hamrick, One Giant Step Closer to Patients'
Rights, AM. MED. NEWS, Nov. 1, 1999, at 20.
93. The American Hospital Association first adopted "A Patient's Bill of
Rights" in 1973. Its latest revision was approved by the ARA Board of Trustees
on October 21, 1992. See American Hospital Association, Management Advisory:
A Patient's Bill of Rights (visited Mar. 13, 1999) <http://www.aha.org/resource/
pbillofrights.html>.
94. AAHP Approves New Patient Protections, 7 HEALTH L. REP. (BNA) 351
(Feb. 26, 1998). A group of HMOs has also announced its allegiance to patient
protection (they call it "consumer" protection) and called for national legal
regulation of managed care plans. See Robert Pear, Three Big Health Plans Join in
Call for National Standards, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 25, 1997, at 28 (Kaiser Permanente,
HIP Health Insurance Plans, and the Group Health Cooperative of Puget
Sound joined in issuing a "statement of principles for consumer protection").
For a skeptical view about the AAHP's "Putting Patients First" initiative, see
Jerome P. Kassirer, Managing Managed Care's Tarnished Image, 337 NEW ENG. J.
MED. 338, 338-39 (1997) (arguing that it "amounts to little more than a thinly
veiled attempt to ward off state and federal legislative actions to curb the abuses
of managed care").
WHY LAW PERVADES MEDICINE
debates on Capitol Hill during the past two years has been over
competing Democratic and Republican proposals for a patients'
bill of rights.95 Why now is everyone clamoring to portray them-
selves as friends of patients?
Perhaps the patient has so many friends these days because,
as the old saying goes, "The enemy of my enemy is my friend."
An editorial in a leading medical journal began with dramatic
war-like language: "The patient-physician relationship is under
siege."" The AMA's patient protection campaigns and the com-
peting proposals for a patients' bill of rights are largely targeted
at perceived ethical abuses by managed care companies and pay-
ers of health care services.9 7 Doctors and hospitals now see
themselves, or at least portray themselves, as aligned with
patients as they struggle in the larger battle against their com-
mon enemy-insurance companies, HMOs, and others who pay
for health care services."
As was earlier observed in the context of the doctor-patient
relationship,99 the invitation to get the law involved in ethical
conflicts is nothing new. Whenever there is a social sense of
wrong, injustice, or abuse of power, those who feel harmed turn
to the law for protection. Today, the clarion call for patient pro-
tection legislation reflects a widespread societal concern about
potentially ethically abusive practices among those who pay for
health care services. Those who feel themselves hurt by such
practices-the people who provide those services as well as the
patients who receive them-rally for new laws, backed up by
sanctions, to demonstrate societal intolerance of such behaviors.
The call for law is a call for society to lay down the ethical ground
rules, not just as before within the doctor-patient relationship,
but now in the whole health care industry.'0°
95. See supra notes 23-31.
96. Glass, supra note 91, at 147. Note also the AMA's "battle" language to
describe its campaign for patient protection legislation. See id.
97. See AMA Advocates, supra note 92, at 310 ("The American Medical
Association has launched an intensive, nationwide campaign that it hopes will
result in the enactment of a 'bill of rights' to protect patients from abusive
health plan practices.").
98. See Aggressive AMA, supra note 92, at 21 (The AMA campaign "empha-
sizes the rights of both patients and physicians, which ... are intertwined.... If
the physician stands up to the health plan, it is the physician who suffers. If the
physician is forced to buckle under, it is the patient who suffers.").
99. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
100. No less a figure than Dr. Arnold Relman, editor emeritus of the New
England Journal of Medicine, has in the past urged: "State and federal legislatures
must be prepared to develop, together with organized medicine, laws that will
define the limits of ethical practice." Janice Perrone, Physician, Police Thyself;
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B. JCAHO's Accreditation Requirement for a Code of Organization
Ethics: Law Packs Ethics with a Punch
In 1995, JCAHO saw clearly how the changing marketplace
for health care was placing new economic and ethical pressures
on health care providers. At that time, the Joint Commission cre-
ated a new accreditation standard on organization ethics. The
new standard required a hospital to implement a "code of ethical
behavior" on the following activities: marketing; patient admis-
sion, transfer, and discharge; billing practices; and the relation-
ship of the organization and its staff to other health care
providers, educational institutions, and payers.1"1 In 1998,
JCAHO added to this accreditation standard for an organization
ethics code the requirement that a hospital "protects the integ-
rity of clinical decision-making," regardless of its compensation
or risk-sharing arrangements with its leaders, managers, clinical
staff, and licensed independent practitioners.
10 2
What prompted JCAHO in the mid-1990s to get serious
about business ethics in health care organizations? After all, its
accreditation standards already addressed medical ethics and
patients' rights.1"' JCAHO was probably notjust jumping on the
bandwagon of corporate mission statements and business ethics
codes.1"4 Rather, JCAHO was concerned that, in the ever
increasingly competitive health care environment, health care
organizations might be tempted to compromise on patient care.
A spokesman for the Commission flatly stated that the newly
adopted 1995 accreditation requirements were "guided by the
Can Renewed Emphasis on Ethics Blunt Government Regulation, AM. MED. NEWS, Apr.
27, 1992, at 3.
101. See 1 JOINT COMMISSION ON ACCREDITATION OF HEALTHCARE ORGANI-
ZATIONS, 1995 ACCREDITATION MANUAL FOR HOSPITALS Standard RI.4-RI.4.2
(1995) [hereinafter 1995JCAHO MANUAL]. This 1995 edition of the Accredita-
tion Manual introduced the standard under the heading "Patient Rights and
Organizational Ethics," althoughJCAHO has changed the phrase from "organi-
zational ethics" to "organization ethics" in later editions of the accreditation
and standards volumes.
102. JOINT COMMISSION ON ACCREDITATION OF HEALTHCARE ORGANIZA-
TIONS, 1998 HOSPITAL ACCREDITATION STANDARDS Standard R.4.4 (1998) [here-
inafterJCAHO 1998 STANDARDS].
103. See 1995 JCAHO MANUAL, supra note 101, Standard R.1- RI.1.3.
JCAHO has parallel requirements for organization ethics codes for managed
care plans which it accredits. See Managed Care: MCOs Embrace Ethics Committees
to Tackle Tough Treatment Decisions, 7 HEALTH L. REP. (BNA) 683 (1998). For
health care networks, see JCAHO Releases Accreditation Standards for Evaluating
Health Care Networks, 3 HEALTH L. REP. (BNA) 15 (1994).
104. See FRANCiSJ. AGUILAR, MANAGING CORPORATE ETHICS 61 (1994) ("By
one account, over 80 percent of major corporations have adopted codes of
ethics.").
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times, and the current environment in health care suggests a
need for standards that address conflict of interest statements
and a code of ethical behavior. We must assure that contractual
... agreements never compromise patient care."' 5 According to
the Commission, the role of ethics in health care, whether medi-
cal ethics or business ethics, is fundamentally to assure quality of
patient care: "The question to be considered is always, from an
ethical standpoint, will this business practice improve the quality
of health care for patients. The answer to that question ulti-
mately will guide each decision."'6
What is interesting about the Commission's targeting these
particular activities in the new organization ethics code require-
ment-marketing, billing, patient admissions and discharge,
conflicts of interest, and compensation arrangements-is that
these same activities are also the current targets of the most
intense legal scrutiny in the history of health care law enforce-
ment. Because of rapid changes in health care markets,
increased competition, and an increased focus on constraining
costs, redoubled efforts are being made to ensure legal-as well
as ethical-behavior by health care organizations. The tempta-
tion for health care organizations to put profits ahead of patients
is causing a societal backlash that concerns not just the profes-
sional accreditors, but law enforcers as well.
As illustrated below, for each business practice which
JCAHO briefly identifies for inclusion in a hospital's organiza-
tion ethics code, there is a corresponding host of laws, regula-
tions, and litigation addressing the same conduct. JCAHO says
simply: "The code ensures that the hospital conducts its business
practices and patient care practices in an honest, decent, and
proper manner. '10 7 Increasingly called upon to define the
thresholds of ethical practice, the law packs this straightforward
ethical ideal with a punch of regulatory complexity and criminal
and civil liability. The threat of that punch-far more than the
accreditation requirement for an ethics code-has fostered a vir-
tual industry of corporate compliance programs in health care
organizations today. After exploring how the law reinforces each
of the organization ethics standards of JCAHO through regula-
tion and potential liability, this essay will turn to the obvious
question: Why didn't JCAHO simply say, "Obey the law"?
105. Managed Care Brings a Demand for Institutional Ethics Policies, 10 MED.
ETHics ADVISOR 125 [hereinafter Managed Care].
106. Id. at 128.
107. JCAHO 1998 STANDARDS, supra note 102, at 55 (setting out, for
mandatory compliance, the "Intent of RI.4 Through RI.4.2").
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1. Billing Practices
JCAHO briefly noted in its 1995 accreditation manual: "To
support ethical operations, an organization must have in place a
mechanism to ensure that patients are billed for only those serv-
ices and care provided."0 8 A simple, clear, straightforward ethi-
cal proposition: bill only for the services you actually perform or
the care you actually provide. Alleged violations of this ethical
proposition have created a virtual firestorm of investigations and
litigation throughout the health care industry. Industry concern
over the government's crackdown on fraud and abuse topped
the Top 10 List of health law developments for 1998 and ranked
second for 1999.109 Health care fraud enforcement has become
a top priority at the Department ofJustice, which recovered $1.2
billion from its enforcement activities in 1997.110
JCAHO's ethical standard to ensure proper billing has been
dwarfed by a legion of law enforcement activities addressing hos-
pital billing practices. In the past few years, the federal govern-
ment has pursued alleged hospital fraud, much of it in the billing
area, through at least six major enforcement intiatives:..' Lab-
Scam,' 12 the 72-Hour Window Project,11 the Lab Unbundling
108. Compare 2 1995 JCAHO MANuAL, supra note 101, at 23 (requiring
that an organization have in place the mechanism described), with JCAHO
1998 STANDARDS ("The code ensures that the hospital conducts its business and
patient care practices in an honest, decent, and proper manner.").
109. See HLR's Top 10 Health Law Developments for 1998, 7 HEALTH L. REP.
(BNA) 5 (1998); HLR's Top 10 Health Law Issues for 1999, 8 HEALTH L. REP.
(BNA) 5 (1999).
110. See Roundup: DOJ Recovered $1.2 Billion in Fiscal 1997 in Fight Against
Health Fraud, Report Says, 7 HEALTH L. REP. (BNA) 1793 (1998) [hereinafter DOJ
Recovered]. See also Peter Eisler & Barbara Pearson, Feds Triple Health Fraud Cases
/ Crackdown Hits Medicare Billing Abuses, USA TODAY, Feb. 23, 1999, at 1A (stat-
ing that U.S. attorneys prosecuted 552 criminal cases of health care fraud in
1997; the Medicare program lost an estimated $12.6 billion last year (six per-
cent of its expenditures) to fraud and abuse; and civil and criminal enforce-
ment actions in 1998 resulted in approximately $500 million in judgments,
settlements, and fines).
111. See Ursala Himali, Fraud: Government Approach to Investigating False
Claims Varies By Initiative, 6 HEALTH L. REP. (BNA) 45, d39 (1997) ("law enforce-
ment's approach to investigating the submission of false claims to federal and
state health insurance programs is multidimensional, and there is no end in
sight to the initiatives being launched").
112. See id. (referring to an investigation targeting fraudulent billing by
the nation's largest independent clinical laboratories).
113. See Himali, supra note 111, at 48 ("Since December 1994, the Penn-
sylvania U.S. Attorney's Office has been investigating abuses of the '72-hour
rule' which stipulates that hospitals cannot submit separate bills to cover certain
outpatient tests if the Medicare patient is admitted to the hospital within 72
hours of the test."); Health Fraud Comprises Two-Thirds of Pending DOJ Civil Fraud
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Project,114 the Physicians at Teaching Hospitals (PATH) initia-
tive,"' the diagnosis-related grouping upcoding project, 1 6 and
the transfer/discharge project.1 17 As if these government-initi-
ated investigations into alleged health care billing fraud were not
enough, hospitals also face the prospect of multi-million dollar
litigation in qui tam lawsuits initiated by private persons, or
whistleblowers (frequently disgruntled former employees),
under the False Claims Act.1 18 To prevent false billing, or at least
to forestall prosecution and litigation for alleged false billing,
health care providers are hiring attorneys, accountants, and con-
sultants to create corporate compliance programs in record
numbers.119
Cases, GAO Finds, HEALTH NEWS DAILY, Aug. 13, 1998, at 5, [hereinafter Health
Fraud Comprises] ("The Window Project addresses billing for outpatient services
within 72 hours of a hospital admission that are included in the inpatient pro-
spective payment rate.").
114. See Himali, supra note 111 (this project is also known as "Operation
Bad Bundle"); Health Fraud Comprises, supra note 113, at 2 ("The Lab
Unbundling Project focuses on inappropriately high payments for tests that are
performed concurrently on automated equipment.").
115. See Himali, supra note 111, at 50 (targeting over 130 teaching hospi-
tals under PATH as of the end of 1997, "the government is investigating Medi-
care Part B billings by teaching physicians for services performed by interns and
residents").
116. See id. at 51 (project investigates "hospitals that bill consistently for
complex pneumonia, which has a significantly higher DRG than simple pneu-
monia"); Feds Eye Circumstances, Clinical Pathways in DRG Upcoding False Claims
Cases, PHYsICIAN MANAGER, Oct. 2, 1998, at 12 ("DRG upcoding is shaping up
into a major national false claims investigation. The feds say some hospitals
exaggerate patients' symptoms and secondary diagnoses to bill Medicare for a
more-lucrative version of the correct DRG. Examples: pneumonia and
septicemia.").
117. See Himali, supra note 111, at 52:
At issue in the transfer/discharge initiative is when a patient is trans-
ferred from one hospital to another but it is reported as having been a
discharge so that the first hospital the patient was admitted to receives
the full DRG payment as opposed to what the hospital should have
received-a per diem amount based on the number of days the
patient was at the hospital, not to exceed the full DRG. The second
hospital the patient is transferred to should receive the full DRG. "If
the [Medicare] program is billed for two full DRGs, there has been a
false claim."
118. See 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-33 (1994). See generally Patricia Meador & Eliz-
abeth Warren, The False Claims Act: A Civil War Relic Evolves Into a Modern
Weapon, 65 TENN. L. REV. 455 (1998); Marc S. Raspanti & David M. Laigaie,
Current Practice and Procedure Under the Whistleblower Provisions of the Federal False
Claims Act, 71 TEMP. L. REv. 23 (1998).
119. See Thomas E. Bartrum & L. Edward Bryant, The Brave New World of
Health Care Compliance Programs, 6 ANNALS HEALTH L. 51 (1997); Karen Boxer &
Helaine Gregory, Compliance is Good for Your Corporate Health, 1057 PLI/CoP
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2. Marketing and Advertising
JCAHO's new accreditation standard also addressed market-
ing practices: "To support ethical operations, an organization
must have in place a mechanism to ensure that.., marketing...
practices are conducted in an ethical manner."120 JCAHO "rec-
ommends that the hospital adopt a statement of marketing and
public relations practices that addresses issues of truth, accuracy,
fairness, and responsibility to patients, community and the larger
public." '121 These are good, solid, ethical principles: truth, hon-
esty, fairness. Prior to 1995, the law had already reflected these
principles with legislation and regulations governing truth in
advertising. The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has long had
authority to investigate and enjoin false or misleading advertising
under federal law which prohibits unfair acts and practices and
unfair methods of competition. 122 So, for example, the FTC has
challenged as false, deceptive, or misleading the advertising
claims of health care providers involving diet and weight loss pro-
grams, 123 success rates for infertility services 12 4 and cancer treat-
ments, 125  liposuction surgery, 126 surgery for bowel-relateddiseases, 127 and even the efficacy of Prozac as a cure for obes-
711 (1998); Health Attorneys See Rapid Growth in Adoption of Compliance Plans, 5
HEALTH L. REP. (BNA) 33, d5 (1996). See also sources cited infra note 153. In
the past eighteen months, the Office of the Inspector General issued six model
compliance plans for guidance to the health care industry. See OIG Compli-
ance Program Guidance for Clinical Laboratories, 63 Fed. Reg. 45076-03
(1998); OIG Compliance Program Guidance for Hospitals, 63 Fed. Reg. 8987-
02 (1998); OIG Model Compliance Plan for Clinical Laboratories, 62 Fed. Reg.
9435-01 (1997).
120. 1 1995 JCAHO MANUAL, supra note 101, at 23.
121. Changes in Accreditation Thrust Ethics Committees into New Roles, MED.
ETHICS ADVISOR, Jan. 1995, at 1 [hereinafter Changes in Accreditation].
122. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 52-55 (1996).
123. See Two Diet Companies Contest FTC Claims; Three Others Resolve False Ad
Charges, 65 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. 460 (1993); Very-Low-Calorie Diet Pro-
gram Marketers Settle FTC Deceptive Advertising Charges, 64 ANTITRUST & TRADE
REG. REP. 343 (1993).
124. See FTC Is Probing Marketing of Health Care Including Claims by Infertility
Services, 62 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. 283 (1992).
125. See Cancer Treatment Centers Settle FTC Allegations over Ad Claims, 5
HEALTH L. REP. (BNA) 12, d22 (1996).
126. See 56 Fed. Reg. 56228 (1991) (proposed consent agreement with
analysis to aid public comment, requiring Minneapolis cosmetic surgeon to dis-
close risks and have scientific evidence supporting his claims for benefits of
liposuction procedure).
127. See 57 Fed. Reg. 26848 (June 16, 1992) (proposed consent agree-
ment with analysis to aid public comment concerning NME Hospitals, d/b/a/
Continent Ostomy Centers).
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ity.128 One hospital chain has been challenged twice by the FTC
for misleading advertising of ileostomy and in vitro fertilization
services through its specialized clinics. 129 JCAHO's new standard
to ensure ethical marketing practices seems to address the same
concerns as are already addressed by federal and state consumer
protection laws.
3. Patient Admission, Transfer, and Discharge
JCAHO's new accreditation standard also meant that: "To
support ethical operations, an organization must have in place a
mechanism to ensure that ... admission, transfer, and discharge
practices are conducted in an ethical manner."1 ° In 1995,
JCAHO said it wanted to ensure that: "Admissions and transfer
policies are not based on patient or organization economics.
Only patients whose specific condition or disease cannot be
safely treated at the organization are diverted, refused admission,
or transferred to another organization."131 Not coincidentally,
this ethical concern is soundly backed up by numerous laws to
ensure that, due to financial pressures or incentives, hospitals do
not prematurely discharge a patient before he or she is medi-
cally stable;132 that private hospitals do not engage in "patient
dumping" of uninsured patients onto public hospitals; 133 or that
health care organizations do not engage in other discriminatory
128. See Obesity Treatment Ad Touting Prozac Violates Medical Practice Act, 6
HEALTH L. REP. (BNA) 2, d28 (1997).
129. See Hospital Settles FTC Deception Charges, Won't Misrepresent Ileostomy
Rates, 62 ANTITRUST & TRADE REc. RrP. 756 (1992).
130. 2 1995 JCAHO MANUAL, supra note 101, at 23.
131. Id.
132. State law theories of abandonment, negligence, or intentional or
negligent infliction of emotional distress can create hospital liability for denial
of treatment or premature discharge. See, e.g., Muse v. Charter Hosp. of Win-
ston-Salem, 452 S.E.2d 589, 594 (N.C. Ct. App. 1995) (holding that hospital
owed duty not to institute policy or practice which requires that patients be
discharged when their insurance benefits ran out). In 1994, the Health Care
Financing Administration (HCFA) published a final rule that makes it a condi-
tion of participation in Medicare hospitals to have a discharge planning process
for patients. See 42 C.F.R. § 482.43 (1998). HCFA was concerned that lack of
adequate discharge planning might result in "systematic underservice of benefi-
ciary needs", which its requirements were designed to guard against. Medicare:
HCFA Publishes Final Rule on Hospital Discharge Planning Process, DAILY REP. FOR
EXECUTIVES, Dec. 13, 1994, at 237 d12. Interestingly, HCFA expressly found
that compliance with JCAHO accreditation standards for discharge planning
satisfy the new rule. See 42 C.F.R. § 482.43 (1996).
133. See, e.g., Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act of
1986, 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (1994). See also supra notes 15, 16, 19 and accompany-
ing text.
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refusals of treatment based on economics or prejudice, such as
fear of AIDS."'
4. Compensation Arrangements and Risk-Sharing
In 1998, JCAHO added to its accreditation standard for an
organization ethics code a requirement that the hospital "pro-
tects the integrity of clinical decision-making" regardless of its
compensation or risk-sharing financial arrangements with its
administrators or clinicians. This new requirement is doubtless
responsive to emerging ethical concerns about health care prov-
iders who may have financial pressures or incentives to deny or
limit patient care. One of these concerns is that both individual
and institutional providers may feel pressured to cut their costs
by "under-utilizing" medical resources, specifically by failing to
provide necessary medical care.135 Managed-care programs in
134. Both individual and institutional providers may be subject to the
Americans With Disabilities Act of 1990, prohibiting discrimination by public
accommodations on the basis of disability in the provision of their services. See
42 U.S.C.A. §§ 12101-17 (1995). Discriminatory refusals to treat HIV-infected
patients may be challenged under the ADA. See, e.g., Bragdon v. Abbott, 524
U.S. 624 (1998) (holding that HIV infection is a "disability" under the ADA,
even if the infected individual appears asymptomatic); U.S. v. Morvant, 898 F.
Supp. 1157 (E.D. La. 1995) (holding that dentist unlawfully discriminated by
referring out HIV-positive patients); Woolfolk v. Duncan, 872 F. Supp. 1381
(E.D. Pa. 1995) (holding that physician may not deny medical services to HIV-
infected patients); Howe v. Hull, 873 F. Supp. 72 (N.D. Ohio 1994) (holding
that the hospital and physician violated ADA by pretextual refusal to admit HIV-
infected patient). See generally Lawrence 0. Gostin et al., Disability Discrimination
in America: HIV/AIDS and Other Health Conditions, 281 JAMA 745 (1999).
135. The Office of the Inspector General was so concerned about the
prospect (and reports) of hospitals providing financial incentives to doctors to
reduce the amount of care they provide patients that it proposed a specific rule
allowing civil monetary penalties against (1) a hospital "who knowingly makes a
payment, directly or indirectly, overtly or covertly, in cash or in kind, to a physi-
cian as an inducement to reduce or limit services provided to an individual who
is eligible for Medicare or Medicaid benefits and who is under the direct care of
the physician that knowingly accepts receipt of such payment," and (2) a physi-
cian who knowingly receives such a payment. 59 Fed. Reg. 61571, 61574
(1994). Critics of the proposed rule argued that "its vague wording could jeop-
ardize almost any hospital incentive plan under managed care-including capi-
tation's withholds and risk pools." Julie Johnsson, No Incentives to Limit Care:
New Federal Rule Bans Hospitals from Encouraging Reduced Services, Am. MED. NEWS,
Dec. 26, 1994, at 1, 24. The Final Rule allows civil penalties against physicians
who do not meet Medicare/Medicaid requirements for incentive plans. See 42
C.F.R. § 1003.100 (1998). In turn, the Medicare/Medicaid participation
requirements state that a specified insurer "may operate a physician incentive
plan only if... [n]o specific payment is made directly or indirectly under the
plan to a physician or physician group as an inducement to reduce or limit
medically necessary services .... " 42 C.F.R. § 417.479 (1998). Recently, the
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particular have been the subject of considerable commentary on
this score.136 Whether or not these financial considerations have
actually resulted in limitations or denials of medically necessary
care by providers or insurers is still hotly debated."3 7 Widespread
OIG said in a special advisory bulletin that a common hospital practice known
as "gainsharing"-whereby hospitals financially reward physicians who help
achieve cost-savings for the hospitals-implicated these concerns and was illegal
under 42 U.S.C. § 1128A(b) (1) and (2). See Katherine E. Harris & Barbara
Yuill, IG Strikes Down Gainsharing, Says CMP Law Bans Incentives to Curb Care, 8
HEALTH L. REP. (BNA) 1133 (1999). See generally D. McCarty Thornton & Kevin
G. McAnaney, Recent Commentary Distorts HHS IG's Gainsharing Special Advisory
Bulletin, 8 HEALTH L. REP. (BNA) 1522 (1999).
136. See, e.g., American Medical Association, Council on Ethical and Judi-
cial Affairs, Ethical Issues in Managed Care, 273 JAMA 330, 330-35 (1995) ("[I]n
their zeal to control utilization, managed care plans may withhold appropriate
diagnostic procedures or treatment modalities for patients."); Kevin Grumbach
et al., Primary Care Physicians' Experience of Financial Incentives in Managed-Care
Systems, 339 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1516 (1998) (in one study, 57% of surveyed pri-
mary care physicians reported that they were being rewarded by managed care
organizations for limiting referrals, and 17% of those believed this compro-
mised the quality of patient care); Alan L. Hillman, Financial Incentives for Physi-
cians in HMOs: Is There a Conflict of Interest?, 317 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1743 (1987);
Alan L. Hillman et al., How Do Financial Incentives Affect Physicians' Clinical Deci-
sions and the Financial Performance of Health Maintenance Organizations?, 321 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 86, 86-92 (1989); Marc A. Rodwin, Conflicts in Managed Care, 332
NEW ENG.J. MED. 604, 605 (1995) ("Many financial incentives for physicians to
control costs create conflicts of interest that compromise the interests of
patients. Most [HMOs and a few PPOs] increase or decrease a physician's com-
pensation depending on the cost implications of his or her clinical choices or
the organization's profitability."); supra note 27.
137. Some studies find a difference in the provision of treatment to
patients depending upon the payment systems for the providers. See, e.g., John
Rapoport et al., Resource Utilization Among Intensive Care Patients: Managed Care vs.
Traditional Insurance, 152 ARCH. INT. MED. 2207 (1992); Sheldon Retchin et al.,
Outcomes of Stroke Patients in Medicare Fee for Service and Managed Care, 278 JAMA
119 (1997). Other studies have found little or no difference in the care pro-
vided to patients under different payment systems. See, e.g., Derek C. Angus et
al., The Effect of Managed Care on ICU Length of Stay: Implications for Medicare, 276
JAMA 1075 (1996); Geri Aston, Study: HMO Hospital Stays Same as Fee for Service,
AM. MED. NEWS, Nov. 3, 1997, at 6; Sheldon Greenfield et al., Outcomes of Patients
with Hypertension and Non-Insulin-Dependent Diabetes Mellitus Treated By Different
Systems and Specialties: Result from the Medical Outcomes Study, 274 JAMA 1436
(1995). Some studies have suggested that the provision of less care due to
financial incentives may result in improved quality of care. See e.g., Daniel J.
Cher & Leslie A. Lenert, Method of Medicare Reimbursement and the Rate of Poten-
tially Ineffective Care of Critically Ill Patients, 278 JAMA 1001 (1997). See generally
Barry R. Furrow, Regulating the Managed Care Revolution: Private Accreditation and
a New System Ethos, 43 VILL. L. REv. 361, 384 (1998) (collecting many studies and
concluding that the evidence "supports claims that managed care has substan-
tial advantages over FFS [traditional fee-for-service payment] plans not only in
controlling costs, but also in maintaining or even improving the quality of care
for subscribers"). Many observers have called for more research to determine
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societal concern that they have, however, is reflected in the tre-
mendous amount of recent litigation by patients alleging that
they have been improperly denied such care by their health
plans, doctors, and hospitals based on claims under federal law as
well as under traditional state law theories such as malpractice,
corporate negligence, fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, and other
traditional state law claims.138 Indeed, the most strenuously con-
the actual effects of financial incentives on quality of patient care. See, e.g., R.
Adams Dudley et al., The Impact of Financial Incentives on Quality of Care, 76
MILLBANK Q. 649 (1998); Patrick H. Mattingly, Observations From the Field: Effects
of Financial Incentives on Quality of Care, 76 MILLBANK Q. 733 (1998); Steven D.
Pearson et al., Sounding Board: Ethical Guidelines for Physician Compensation Based
on Capitation, 339 NEw ENG. J. MED. 689 (1998).
138. The explosion in litigation in this area has been matched by the
amount of academic writing on it in recent years. Forjust a few of the array of
articles collecting court cases and discussing the effect of federal ERISA pre-
emption on this ligitation, see, for example, Brian P. Battaglia, The Shift Toward
Managed Care and Emerging Liability Claims Arising from Utilization Management
and Financial Incentive Arrangements Between Health Care Providers and Payers, 19 U.
ARK. LITTLE RoCK L.J. 155 (1997); Jose L. Gonzalez, A Managed Care Organiza-
tion's Medical Malpractice Liability for Denial of Care: The Lost World, 35 Hous. L.
REv. 715 (1998); Peter D.Jacobson & Scott D. Pomfret, Form, Function, and Man-
aged Care Torts: Achieving Fairness and Equity in ERISA Jurisprudence, 35 Hous. L.
REv. 985 (1998); Jeffrey E. Shuren, Legal Accountability for Utilization Review in
ERISA Health Plans, 77 N.C. L. REv. 731 (1999).
HMO denials of medically necessary or medically appropriate care have
received considerable negative publicity, see supra note 28, and have been the
subject of numerous lawsuits. During the fall of 1999, a series of class actions
against HMOs was initiated across the country for alleged violations of federal
law under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act
and the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA). See Plan Liability:
Class Actions Against HMOs Climb as 'REPAIR Team, Physicians File More Suits, 8
HEALTH L. REP. (BNA) 1887 (Dec. 2, 1999). Individual actions brought under
various federal and state law theories are also increasingly common. See, e.g., In
re U.S. Healthcare, 193 F.3d 151 (3d Cir. 1999) (allowing negligence claims);
Giles v. NYLCare Health Plans, 172 F.3d 332 (5th Cir. 1999) (allowing vicarious
liability and negligence claims); Dukes v. U.S. Healthcare, 57 F.3d 350 (3d Cir.
1995) (allowing negligence and malpractice claims); Moscovitch v. Danbury
Hosp., 25 F. Supp. 74 (D. Conn. 1998) (allowing negligence claim); Drolet v.
Healthsource, 968 F. Supp. 757 (D. N.H. 1997) (allowing misrepresentation
claim under ERISA); Petrovich v. Share Health Plan of Ill., 719 N.E.2d 756 (Ill.
1999) (allowing vicarious liability claim); Neade v. Portes, 710 N.E.2d 418 (I11.
App. Ct. 1999) (allowing breach of fiduciary duty claim); Pappas v. Asbel, 724
A.2d 889 (Pa. 1999) (allowing negligence claim) cert. pet. filed, 67 USLW 3717
(1999). Although numerous state laws already exist that could be used to
address wrongful denials of benefits, one problem for plaintiffs has been that
courts have often interpreted ERISA to pre-empt these state law claims. See, e.g.,
Andrews-Clarke v. Travelers Ins. Co., 984 F. Supp. 49 (D. Mass.1997):
This case, thus, becomes yet another illustration of the glaring need
for Congress to amend ERISA to account for the changing realities of
the modern healthcare system .... ERISA has evolved into a shield of
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tested issue in the whole controversy these past two years over
proposals for a patients' bill of rights has been whether patients
ought to be allowed to sue their health care providers and payers
for improper-and potentially unethical-denial of benefits
under these traditional state law theories of liability.139 The
JCAHO standard thus identifies an ethical principle, whose
potential breach has already been the target of considerable
legal attention in recent years.
5. Conflicts of Interest
In 1995, the JCAHO organization ethics standard as origi-
nally implemented was addressed to the somewhat more "garden
variety" of conflicts of interests that may arise in contracts
immunity that protects health insurers, utilization review providers,
and other managed care entities from potential liability for the conse-
quences of their wrongful denial of health benefits.
See generally Margaret G. Farrell, ERISA Pre-Emption and Regulation of Managed
Health Care: the Case for Managed Federalism, 23 AM. J.L. & MED. 251 (1997); Peter
D. Jacobson, Legal Challenges to Managed Care Cost Containment Programs: An Ini-
tial Assessment, 18 HEALTH AFFAiRS 69 (1999). Some plaintiffs have recently
avoided having their state law claims against HMOs preempted by ERISA by
characterizing their actions as challenges to the quality of medical care they
received or as medical negligence, rather than as a denial of benefits. See Rob-
ert Pear, Series of Rulings Eases Constraints on Suing H.M. 0. 's, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 15,
1999, at Al.
139. Whether patients will be allowed to sue their health plans under
state law theories, or whether such claims will continue to be preempted by
ERISA, remains one of the most debated issues in managed care reform and
proposals for patient protection legislation. See Susan Webster, Managed Care
Regulation Tops 1999 Health Issues List; Fraud Crackdown Ranked Second, 8 HEALTH
L. REP. (BNA) 5 (1999) (managed care reform is the number one health law
issue for 1999, with ERISA preemption being a major component of the
debate); see also Aston, A Big Win, supra note 23 ('biggest area of disagreement
is whether people with employer-based health coverage should be able to sue
their health plan for malpractice if they think the plan has denied them a medi-
cally necessary benefit"); Geri Aston, Health Plan Liability Erupts at Center of House
Battle, Am. MED. NEws, Sept. 27, 1999, at 1 ("the battle over managed care
patient protections in the House has boiled down to one issue: health plan
liability"). While so far only a few states, such as Texas and Georgia, have
enacted laws to allow HMOs to be sued for their coverage decisions such as
denials of benefits, 31 states have indicated that health plan liability will con-
tinue to be a high priority issue in their legislatures during the coming year. See
Stephen Piontek, Life or Money?, NAT'L UNDERWRITER LIFE & HEALTH-FIN.
SERV. ED., Aug. 3, 1998, at 49 ("The nub of all the disputing over patient protec-
tions going on in Congress now really comes down to whether patients should
be allowed to hold their health plans legally liable for adverse decisions."); State-
By-State Report, supra note 24; see also supra note 29. Although numerous state
laws already exist that could be used to address wrongful denials of benefits, the
problem has been that federal ERISA law has been interpreted to preempt
these state law claims. See generally Farrell, supra note 138.
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between a health care organization and its suppliers.140 This sort
of conflict of interest, potentially involving self-dealing by the
members of a corporate governing board, is standard fare for
legal sanction in state corporations laws.1 4' The federal anti-kick-
back laws' 42 are also designed to prevent ethical abuses caused by
self-interested transactions. In particular, the federal Office of
the Inspector General has published numerous Special Fraud
Alerts dealing with potential violations of the anti-kickback laws
140. 2 1995JCAHO MANUAL, supra note 101, at 23 ("The governing body
needs to review relationships carefully and ensure that its mission to its patients
and community is not harmed by any contractual relationship.... The pro-
posed contract is approved or rejected based on best-bid practices and the
potential for conflict of interest."). Some areas where conflicts may arise in a
health care institutional setting are relationships between a hospital pharmacy
and drug companies, and an institution's financial interests in the research con-
ducted on its premises. See, e.g., EzekielJ. Emaneul & Daniel Steiner, Sounding
Board: Institutional Conflict of Interest, 332 NEW ENG. J. MED. 262 (1995) ("Finan-
cial conflicts of interest in a research setting can adversely affect patient care,
teaching, and research .... Less attention has been paid to the conflicts of
interest that arise when health care institutions have a financial stake in the
research conducted in their laboratories and clinics."); Managed Care, supra
note 105, at 126:
The conduct of hospital pharmacists and physicians who sit on hospi-
tal formulary committees that review and determine hospital drug sup-
plies can be compromised by drug company marketing
enticements.... The capacity for drug companies to influence hospi-
tal formulary development isjust one of many reasons why it is incum-
bent upon hospitals to develop a code of ethical behavior.
141. See American Hospital Association, Management Advisory: Resolution of
Conflicts of Interest (1990):
Duality of interest can raise the potential for a conflict of interest
when the personal interests of institutional officials come in conflict
with the interests of the institution.... The laws of the various states
prohibit or severely restrict actions made under a conflict of interest
by a fiduciary, that is, an individual occupying a special position of
trust and responsibility. Officers, governing board members, and in
some states other officials of health care institutions should be guided
by the laws governing a fiduciary. Ethics are supported by these laws.
See also Boston Children's Heart Found., Inc. v. Nadal-Ginard, 73 F.3d 429 (1st
Cir. 1996) (former president of a nonprofit corporation breached his fiduciary
duty by failing to disclose to the board that he was the director of another
organization performing work in the same general area at the same hospital
where he worked on behalf of the corporation); Mary v. Lupin Found., 609
So.2d 184 (La. 1992) (holding that cause of action for breach of fiduciary
duties is made out upon allegations that inside directors of a nonprofit corpora-
tion sold a hospital (the corporation's principal asset) for $5 million less than
its actual value and secretly structured an improper side deal with the prospec-
tive purchaser).
142. See 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b) (soliciting or receiving illegal remunera-
tion); see also 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn (prohibiting "physician self-referrals," or refer-
rals to providers in which referring physician has a financial interest).
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in the health care field, and involving potential conflicts of inter-
est which can compromise the quality of patient care.'
43
C. Why Didn't JCAHO Simply Say, "Obey the Law"?
The question naturally arises, why did JCAHO decide to
require hospitals to adopt a code of organization ethics when
there were already numerous federal and state laws on the books
addressed to the very same subjects? Why not just tell the hospi-
tals, "Obey the law"? Why would JCAHO require a code of
organization ethics that seems to duplicate everything the law
already requires health care organizations to do? Was itjust win-
dow-dressing? Perhaps, but there are a couple of less cynical
possibilities.
1. Professional Self-Policing
One possibility is that the Commission is only doing what is
required of all sectors of society that want to be called "profes-
sions": they insist on self-regulation and self-policing. That is one
of the key distinguishing features between a business and a pro-
fession. A profession engages in self-regulation.144  The law
enforcers cannot catch everyone; a lot of misconduct falls
between the cracks.' 45 Perhaps JCAHO recognized that a pro-
143. The OIG has issued ten "Special Fraud Alerts" to the health care
industry warning of potential enforcement targets and addressing the following
topic areas that could violate the anti-kickback statute: joint venture arrange-
ments; routine waiver of Medicare Part B co-payments and deductibles; hospital
incentives to referring physicians; prescription drug marketing practices;
arrangements for the provision of clinical laboratory services; home health
fraud; fraud and abuse in the provision of medical supplies to nursing facilities;
fraud and abuse in the provision of services in nursing facilities; fraud and
abuse in nursing home arrangements with hospices; and physician liability for
certifications in the provision of medical equipment and supplies and home
health services. See 59 Fed. Reg. 65373 (1994) (publishing first five alerts,
addressing prescription drug marketing schemes, physician investors in joint
ventures, waivers of co-payments or deductibles, hospital incentive payments to
physicians, and clinical lab services); Dept. of Health and Human Serv, Office
of the Sec., Office of Ins. Gen., Special Fraud Alerts, (visited March 13, 1999)
<http://www.hhs.gov/progorg/oig/frdalrt/index.htm>.
144. "The hallmark of professionalism is self-regulation," said AMA's then
Executive Vice-President James Todd, M.D. Perrone, supra note 100, at 3.
145. EMTALA provides a good example, for there is evidence that gov-
ernment enforcement has been insufficient to prevent ongoing violations of
the statute and persistent patient-dumping practices. See Dame, supra note 19,
at 11-21; Scaduto, supra note 16, at 968-75. Fraud and abuse enforcement is
another example. While in 1997 the DOJ did recover $1.2 billion in settle-
ments and judgments, hired an additional 285 attorneys and agents devoted
exclusively to health care fraud, and opened more than 4,000 civil fraud cases
(nearly double the number from the year before), see DOJ Recovered, supra note
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fession worthy of the name will take it upon itself to uncover and
correct wrong-doing. JCAHO understandably takes the position
that the primary purpose of health care organizations is to pro-
vide patients with appropriate, high-quality health care.
146
Beyond legal compliance, ethical conduct by health care provid-
ers ultimately promotes the quality of care delivered to
patients. 147
2. Going Beyond the Law
Another, related possibility is that JCAHO is deliberately
reflecting a key distinction between law and ethics, in the sense
of recognizing that ethics is aspirational, and covers a lot of con-
duct not necessarily prohibited by law. Law may set the floors
below which behavior may not sink without incurring societal
sanction, but ethics creates the ceilings that good people aspire
to reach. JCAHO's inclusion of marketing practices in the code
of ethics is a good example here. The law's attention to ethical
marketing practices focuses on setting ground rules: is the adver-
tising truthful-not false, deceptive, or misleading? If yes, then it
is legal. Ethics' attention to marketing practices goes further and
might ask, is the advertising responsible and socially appropriate?
110, these efforts address only a fraction of the overall loss to the federal gov-
emnment through erroneous payments to providers, see Kristen Hallam, HCFA
Raises the Bar for Fraud Detection, MODERN HEALTHcARE, Feb. 15, 1999 (reporting
that an audit by the Department of Health and Human Services of Medicare
overpayments revealed that $20.3 billion (11%) of all Medicare payments in
1997 were erroneous overpayments; the error rate decreased in 1998, down to
7%, or $12.6 billion, in overpayments). Federal enforcers know that they are
targeting only the tip of the iceberg in bringing civil and criminal actions, and
they have relied on a variety of forms of self-help and self-policing, including
reliance on (1) so-called whistleblowers to bring qui tam actions under the
False Claims Act, see supra note 118, (2) the voluntary corporate compliance
programs described in this essay, and (3) voluntary disclosures by health care
organizations who discover illegal conduct. See Aaron M. Altschuler et al.,
Health Care Fraud, 35 Am. CRiM. L. REv. 841 (1998). The OIG has initiated a
Provider Self-Disclosure Protocol to encourage providers to voluntarily disclose
violations of the fraud laws. See 63 Fed. Reg. 58399 (1998); see also OIG's web-
site (visited Dec. 12, 1999) <http://www.hhs.gov/progorg/oig> (voluntary dis-
closure will not necessarily protect providers from civil or criminal action, but
self-reporting "could be a mitigating factor in OIG's recommendations to prose-
cuting agencies").
146. See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
147. See Mary J. Pitzer, Health-Care Firms Realizing Need to Clear Up Ethical
Fuzzy Areas, L.A. TIMES, June 8, 1998, at D22 ("Although these [corporate com-
pliance] programs start with regulatory compliance, they often don't end there.
Billing problems, financial conflicts of interest, harassment and staffing levels
all can fall under the ethics umbrella. And they all ultimately affect quality of
care if resources are diverted from patient care.").
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Does it, for example, encourage unhealthy practices, such as was
alleged in the marketing of breast milk substitutes in Third
World countries? Does health care advertising create, rather
than simply channel, demand for health care services? Does it
reflect negative social stereotyping?1"' On each of the issues
required to be included in a hospital's organization ethics code,
JCAHO has implicitly challenged hospitals to go beyond the legal
minimums.
Through the new accreditation standard on organization
ethics, JCAHO hopes to instill ethical sensitivity throughout the
institution, rather than allow ethics to be seen as the purview of
the few members of the ethics committee. As a JCAHO spokes-
person said, "Ethical behavior ideally will become a daily interest
of management and staff.""' But will people really care about
ethical ideals when the federal agents are knocking at the door,
or the accountants and lawyers keep interrupting with new and
improved corporate compliance programs? Once they all leave,
is it "OK everybody, back to work"?
D. Corporate Compliance Programs: Example of the Legal
Power/Ethical Pitfall Problem
Unfortunately, corporate compliance programs may be
doing to organization ethics what informed consent forms did to
148. See Leonard J. Weber, The Ethics of Health Care Advertising, MICH.
Hosp., Dec. 1988, at 29, 31 (discussing the distinction between a "personal
integrity" model of ethics (which tends to be law's focus) and a "social impact"
model of ethics). Weber observes:
The 'personal integrity' approach to business advertising focuses on
the relationship of advertising to truth-telling and to individual free-
dom, two important values in personal ethics. . . . [Under this
approach,] Advertising should not be deceptive or make false
claims.... Advertising should not be so manipulative that individuals
cannot resist .... The 'social impact' approach to business ethics...
insists... that there are other important ethical concerns as well, that
it is not sufficient to be concerned about manipulation or deception.
Id. The author goes on to discuss advertising that may promote harmful prac-
tices, create needs, or reinforce harmful stereotypes:
It is important to ask what message is being communicated and
received about health care when a hospital advertises its childbirth
services by stressing the medical complications associated with labor
and delivery. It is important to ask what message is being communi-
cated and received when a hospital's advertising stresses the life-saving
'miracles' that take place because of the latest in high-technology
medicine. It is important to ask what the impact of these messages is
on the public's expectations of the kind of health care they can expect
to receive.
Id. at 31-32.
149. Changes in Accreditation, supra note 121, at 7.
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medical ethics: They distract us from thinking about ethics. We
can get so focused on complying with "the letter of the law" that
we are too tired or busy or frustrated to wonder about adhering
to its ethical "spirit." We understandably become satisfied that
compliance with the legal minimums was all that ethics required
us to do.
Here again, the very power of the law creates pitfalls for ethi-
cal reflection. We open up the daily and weekly health care
newspapers and journals, and what do we see? We see evidence
of the law's punch everywhere. We see the reports on who is
being investigated, who is being indicted, who is going to jail,
who paid how many millions of dollars in fines to settle the inves-
tigations, who paid how many millions more when the investiga-
tors would not settle and demanded fines and prison terms, and
so forth.15° Is it any wonder that ethical ideals get lost in the
legal shuffle?
Even if it is understandable that our obsession with law dis-
tracts us from ethical reflection, that distraction is not necessary
or even necessarily excusable. Neither the law nor the devil
makes us do it. The law does not make us forget our ethical
moorings; we just allow ourselves to get side-tracked. Strong cor-
porate compliance programs under the law do not have to sup-
plant even stronger ethical direction by management.15 ' The law
in this area even often reminds us that its purpose is about ethics.
150. Certainly the trade journals for the health care industry are full of
reports of fraud enforcement activities and strategies for responding. See, e.g.,
Sarah A. Klein, Protection or Persecution?, AM. MED. NEws, Feb. 15, 1999 (provid-
ing a sampling of health care providers who have been "snared in the False
Claims net"); John G. Malcolm & Robert F. Schroeder, Health Care Fraud: What
Do You Do Wen the Government Knocks ?, GA. ST. BARJ., Oct. 1998, at 22-30; Molly
Tschida, In the Line of Fire: The Feds Take Aim at Doctors' Billing Practices, MODERN
PHYsicI.N, June 29, 1998, at 23; Top Fraud Cases to Watch in 1999, 8 HEALTH L.
REP. (BNA) 98 (1999) (identifying the top ten health care fraud cases across the
country predicted to make headlines this year). But even the popular press is
full of stories of the government crackdown on health care fraud. See, e.g., Peter
Eisler, Fed's War Against Health Fraud Escalates, USA TODAY, Feb. 23, 1998, at 5B;
Gloria Lau, Gotcha! A Swarm of Federal Inspectors Is Descending on the Nation's Doc-
tors, Hospitals, and Health Plans, FORBES, May 18, 1998, at 130; Robert Pear, Medi-
care Fraud Weapon: Patients/Health-Care: The Government Will Ask Them to Report
Their Doctors and Hospitals If They Suspect Billing Problems, ORANGE COUNTY REG.,
Feb. 21, 1999, at A29.
151. For a discussion contrasting two approaches to corporate compli-
ance programs, one that assimilates compliance into corporate culture and one
that is "superimposed as a bureaucratic replacement for clear conscience," see
William Nolan, Corporate Compliance, Corporate Culture: A Way to Avoid Having 'the
Lawyers' Run Health Care Organizations, BEHAViORAL HEALTH MGMT., Jan.-Feb.
1998, at 34. See also Pitzer, supra note 147 ("'To have just a compliance-driven
program will not ultimately be successful .... Ethics without compliance is a
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The settlement agreements between the government and health
care organizations in health care fraud cases, for example, are
often called "corporate integrity agreements" which set up "cor-
porate integrity programs" within the settling health care organi-
zation. These formal agreements may acknowledge at the very
outset that the settling organization "has expressed an interest in
demonstrating, notwithstanding [its alleged misconduct, that it]
can be trusted to deal fairly and honestly with the Government...
[and that it possesses] the high degree of business integrity required
of a provider participating in federally-funded health care
programs."'
5 2
But those are just the legal forms, and the forms themselves
so often blind us to the ethical substance behind them. The ethi-
cal objectives become buried under the pages and pages of
forms, the mountains and mountains of documents: the subpoe-
nas, the filings, the records, the interrogatories, the financial
statements, the releases, the contracts, the disclaimers, the
memorandums, the charts, the codes, the questionnaires, the
reports, and the compliance plans themselves. 153 The paper trail
seems to lead us into ethical darkness. Who can help but laugh
and think JCAHO was just spitting in the wind back in the mid-
1990s when it said about its new accreditation standard for an
organization code of ethics that: "In some real way this code of
ethics has to be more than just nice words on a piece of
paper"?
15 4
And yetJCAHO was right for the very reason that everyone is
now drowning in paper. This avalanche of paper is in no small
program without teeth. Compliance without ethics is a program that employees
will not buy into."').
152. See, e.g., Corporate Integrity Agreement between National Medical
Enterprises, Inc. (NME) and the Office of the Inspector General, U.S. Dept. of
Health and Human Services (June 29, 1994), at p. 1.
153. See generally Klein, supra note 150 (describing how False Claims Act
prosecutions have generated a compliance industry of insurance carriers, con-
sultants, and newsletters); Sean Martin, Fraud Fears Fuel Growth of Compliance Pro-
grams, Am. Med. News, Dec. 15, 1997, at 3 (describing manuals, guides,
symposia, and the cottage industry of consultants that have sprung up to
address corporate compliance).
154. Changes in Accreditation, supra note 121, at 7. More recently, the
Department of Justice has echoed this sentiment. The Deputy Attorney Gen-
eral has "urged health care lawyers to 'convince your clients to make compli-
ance plans and good stewardship top priorities.' . . . [P]rosecutors will be
looking for 'teeth' in companies' compliance programs, 'not just glossy
brochures.' "Justice Department to Increase Use of False Claims Act To Pursue Hospital
Quality of Care, HEALTH NEws DM L, Oct. 23, 1998 [hereinafter Justice Department
to Increase]. Unfortunately, perhaps it is only after the DOJ repeats the ethical
exhortations of JCAHO that health care providers will actually take heed.
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part a result of the fact that too often, too many people in health
care were not paying attention to the basic ethical question,
"What would be the right thing to do under these circum-
stances?" In the administrative offices and boardrooms of health
care organizations, too many people simply did not ask whether
their billing practices accurately reflected their health care serv-
ices. If some even noticed that board members, administrators,
or clinicians were engaging in self-interested transactions with
contractors or suppliers, they looked the other way. Through
aggressive prosecutions and defensive corporate compliance pro-
grams designed to forestall prosecutions, the law now forces
examination of the basic ethical question in a variety of contexts:
billing, advertising, patient care, conflicts of interest, and com-
pensation arrangements. It is nonetheless ironic that the law's
very power in focusing attention on ethical issues can so easily
create the pitfall of accepting law's minimum requirements as
ethical maximums. As earlier observed, the law itself has never
taken it out of the hands of the health care professionals to strive
for the ethical high ground.
IV. ETHics IN HEALTH CARE: AN ALTERNATIVE TO LAW
It is easy to be cynical about law and ethics and to believe
that, inverting the old saying, in law "it's not the principle, it's
the money." Unfortunately, it is just as easy to be cynical and say
the same thing about medicine and ethics, or about business and
ethics. It is possible, for example, to transform the medical eth-
ics concerns about the provision of futile medical treatment or
physician-assisted suicide into financial concerns about saving
money rather than saving lives. Certainly cynics can (and do)
argue that many of the recent calls for patients' bills of rights
have less to do with protecting patients than with protecting doc-
tors, employers, or even the managed care companies them-
selves.1" Newspapers report as front-page news the views of
155. See Peter T. Kilborn, In Managed Care, "Consumer" Laws Benefit Doctors,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16, 1998, at Al:
Under the banner of consumer protection, legislators are wrestling
with the complaints of specialist physicians who have been losing their
patients, fees and autonomy, those of insurance and managed care
companies whose profits have sunk in competition for patients, and
those employers who pay for much of the coverage.... ["]The quip
going around is that this is physician protection, not consumer
protection."
See also Kassirer, supra note 94 (Kassirer, expressing skepticism about the
AAHP's "Putting Patients First" initiative because it has less to do with protect-
ing patients than protecting managed care companies from increased federal
and state regulation).
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those who say that all the recent patient protection initiatives are
really not about patients, but about "protecting the incomes,jobs
and turf of the health care system's biggest and richest vested
interests."
'15 6
Unless we are prepared to say that money turns all of the
phrases-"legal ethics," or "business ethics," or "medical eth-
ics"-into oxymorons, we should acknowledge that professional
conduct and business conduct ought to be consistent with ethical
conduct.' 57 The question then becomes, "Who is going to
ensure ethical conduct in health care?" The lawyers or the
accountants?1 58 Compliance officers?159 The patients?1 6 ° The
hospital chaplain? An institutional ethics committee?
This last candidate has increasingly been saddled with this
responsibility in recent years. Having previously gotten organ-
ized to address the ethical issues involving patient care, these
156. Kilborn, supra note 155, at Al.
157. See generally Leonard H. Friedman & Grant T. Savage, Can Ethical
Management and Managed Care Coexist ? HEALTH CARE MGMT. REv., Apr 1, 1998,
at 56 ("notwithstanding the pervasive cynicism about the state of business eth-
ics," the authors propose a model for health care management which combines
business ethics and biomedical ethics, positing that "the values of truth-telling,
avoiding harm, respecting authority, and honoring agreements have a higher
institutional priority than earning short-term profits. In the for-profit world of
managed care, the values of social equity and fairness should be added given
the unique status of health care in our society.").
158. The Office of the Inspector General has suggested it may be prefera-
ble, where feasible, to separate the roles of general counsel or chief financial
officer from the role of chief compliance officer, to ensure independent judg-
ment on behalf of the hospital. See OIG Compliance Guidance for Hospitals, 63
Fed. Reg. 8987-02, at 8993 n.35 (1998).
159. To have any effect within a health care organization, a compliance
office must have high-level authority and be able to exercise independent judg-
ment, a tall order for any employee charged with uncovering his or her
employer's ethically or legally questionable conduct. See Kirsten Hallam, A Com-
pliance Problem: HHS, Others Rule out CFOs, Counsels as Ethics Czars, MODERN
HEALTHCARE, Oct. 5, 1998, at 116 (Columbia/HCA's head of compliance said
that a "compliance officer should look at a situation without assuming the com-
pany is right and without assuming management's point of view," while Quo-
rum Health Group's head of compliance observed that a compliance officer has
to be "fearlessly" independent: "you can't always be everyone's friend").
160. Interestingly, both JCAHO and the federal government have
recently initiated programs to recruit patients to report potentially questionable
practices by their health care providers. SeeJCAHO Sets Up Toll-Free Hot Line, 8
HEALTH L. REP. (BNA) 554 (1999) (toll-free hot line to encourage patients,
their families, and others to "share concerns regarding quality-of-care issues at
accredited health care organizations"); Pear, supra note 150 ("The federal gov-
ernment will begin enlisting millions of Medicare beneficiaries in its war against
Medicare fraud next week, urging them to report billing errors, overcharges
and other evidence of possible wrong-doing by their own doctors and
hospitals.").
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hospital committees are now often asked to adopt and imple-
ment the organization ethics code as well.16 It seems a lot to
ask one committee-and usually a volunteer committee at that-
to take the brunt of ensuring the ethical integrity of an entire
institution. Ethics committees already have far too much on
their plate. It is humanly impossible for members of an ethics
committee to be able to understand, let alone absorb and pro-
cess, all of the ethical dilemmas faced both at the bedside and in
the boardrooms of health care organizations.
16 2
In any event, should ethics be handled by committee in the
first place? Admittedly, the law had a hand in promoting ethics
committees a few decades ago.'16  Before the law's intervention,
161. For an overview of the history, role, and function of hospital ethics
committees, see William S. Andereck, Development of a Hospital Ethics Commitee:
Lessons from Five Years of Case Consultation, 1 CAMBRIDGE Q. HEALTHCARE ETHICS
41 (1992); George A. Annas, Ethics Committees: From Ethical Comfort to Ethical
Cover, HASTINGS CENTER REP., May-June 1991, at 18-21. See also infra note 166.
162. Some hospitals have divided the ethics committees in two, "[one] is
for clincial ethics and the other for organization ethics." John C. Fletcher,
Responding to JCAHO Standards: Everybody's Business, 7 J. CUN. ETHICS 182, 183
(1996). Even handling one typical piece of a clinical ethics committee work-
the individual patient case consultation-requires a diversity of people and
strategies which alone can stretch the capacities of committee members to per-
form adequately. See Cynthia B. Cohen, Avoiding "Cloudcuckooland" in Ethics
Committee Case Review: Matching Models to Issues and Concerns, 20 J.L. MED. &
HEALTH CARE 294 (1992).
163. Referring to a 1975 Baylor Law Review article, the court in In re Quin-
lan suggested that a hospital ethics committee could assist the family and physi-
cians in making treatment decisions for incompetent patients. See In re
Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 648 (N.J. 1976) ("I suggest that it would be more appro-
priate to provide a regular forum for more input and dialogue in individual
situations and to allow the responsibility of these judgments to be shared."). A
later NewJersey court commented, "The suggestion of such a committee traces
its origins to Quinlan, where the court contemplated an 'ethics committee' to
confirm the medical prognosis of the patient and, thereby, to immunize the
doctor and the hospital from civil and criminal liability." In reJobes, 529 A.2d
434, 463 (N.J. 1987). Although not expressly calling for ethics "committees",
JCAHO began in 1992 in its accreditation standards to require hospitals to have
in place "a mechanism(s) for the consideration of ethical issues arising in the
care of patients, and to provide education to caregivers and patients on ethical
issues in health care." I JOINT COMMISSION ON ACCREDITATION OF HEALTHCARE
ORGANIZATIONS, 1992 ACCREDITATION MANUAL FOR HOSPITALS, Standard RI.
1.1.6.1 (1992). See also ANNAS, supra note 35, at 6:
[T] he strategy of using ethics committees to provide 'comfort' for phy-
sicians and others worried about either legal liability or public reac-
tion has prospered. Ethics committees have grown from an
anomalous entity to provide ethical comfort to a few, to an almost
standard entity to provide ethical cover for many. Without the threat
of legal liability and community disapproval (which could lead to new
laws), ethics committees would probably not have developed at all.
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there generally were no institutional forums for raising, let alone
formally addressing, ethical questions in health care organiza-
tions. Should health care providers continue to rely so heavily
on ethics by committee today? Like law, the very existence of an
ethics committee poses a pitfall for ethical reflection in the insti-
tution. Whenever any committee is charged with a task, one
problem is the tendency of everybody else in the organization to
refer that task to that committee. Everyone can say, "Hey, that's
their job, that's not my job."'64
The point is, ethics is everybody's job. 65 Institutional ethics
committees can certainly help everybody do theirjob. The com-
mittees can educate; they can set policy; they can even consult on
cases from time to time.' 6 6 It is the responsibility of the highest
management in the institution, however, to instill in everybody a
sense that ethics is their individual priority. Perhaps the best
alternative to having the law take the lead in promoting ethical
conduct in a health care institution is for the members of its
As suggested in this essay, a similar charge may well be leveled at corporate
compliance programs.
164. Corsino, supra note 82, at 177 ("[O]verreliance on bioethics commit-
tees in meetingJCAHO standards can result in ... a disincentive for clinicians
and administrators to understand and promote patients' rights as a regular part
of daily patient care."). Corsino's observations in the context of medical ethics
concerns is equally apt in the context of organization ethics issues: "If ethics
committees become proxies with sole accountability for UCAHO] standards,
then hospital staff may never acquire the wisdom, commitment and multi-disci-
plinary participation necessary to fully incorporate patient rights into daily
patient care." Id. at 180. When ethics is handled by committee, other problems
can arise as well. See Gregory J. Hayes, Ethics Committees: Group Process Concerns
and the Need for Research, 4 CAMBRIDGE Q. HEALTHCAR ETHICS 83, 84 (1995)
(identifying various problems with group dynamics, such as a lack of diversity
within the committee, dominance by a few powerful members, drifting away
from the original mission, and failure to consider alternatives adequately in an
effort to reach consensus quickly); Diane E. Hoffman, Evaluating Ethics Commit-
tees: A View from the Outside, 71 MILLBANK Q. 677, 683 (1993) (noting a concern
about potentially conflicting roles of an ethics committee in trying to serve the
interests of both caregivers and patients); Giles R. Scofield, Ethics Consultation:
The Least Dangerous Profession?, 2 CAMBRIDGE Q. HEALTHCARE ETHICS 417 (1993)
(noting common criticisms of ethics committees that they are time consuming
and unwieldly and suffer from "group-think" and "non-think").
165. See Fletcher, supra note 162, at 182 (observing that "the ethics of
patient care is everybody's business").
166. These three functions are frequently viewed as the primary ones for
hospital ethics committees. See, e.g., David C. Blake, The Hospital Ethics Commit-
tee: Health Care's Moral Conscience or White Elephant ?, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Jan.-
Feb. 1992, at 6; John C. Fletcher & Mark Siegler, What Are the Goals of Ethics
Consultation? A Consensus Statement, 7 J. CUNICAL ETHICS 122 (1996).
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highest management to shoulder that responsibility-visibly,
credibly, and passionately.
167
Ethics in health care inevitably means asking how conduct
will affect the quality of care of patients.168 Those who serve in
the highest levels of a health care organization have the greatest
opportunity-and responsibility-for ensuring its ethical integ-
rity. Like the law, management has the power to pack ethics with
a punch. It only needs the will to do so. The highest levels of
administration have the power-and the duty-to set the ethical
tone of an organization, to demonstrate their ethical commit-
ment throughout every department of the institution, and to pro-
vide ongoing oversight and sanctions, if necessary. Ethics
committees can greatly support management and can even take
the lead in charting an institution's responses to ethical dilem-
mas as they arise. But ethics committees, like ethics in general,
serve primarily an aspirational role. They often lack the power
within the institution to make ethics happen. The highest
administrative levels in the organization do have this power, and
they have the duty to exercise it responsibly.
167. A case in point may be Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp. In the
wake of numerous government investigations in recent years:
[Columbia/HCA says it is now] putting teeth into its new ethics and
compliance program.... [T] he new emphasis of Columbia's top man-
agement has gone beyond demonstrating legal and regulatory compli-
ance to establishing a "set of aspirations in terms of overall conduct
that doesn't have to do with the law," says Alan Yuspeth, Columbia's
senior vice president of ethics and compliance. "It has to do with what
we're about as an organization, what kind of culture we want to have."
Vida Foubister, Fostering a New Corporate Culture, Am. MED. NEWS, Aug. 10, 1998,
at 12. Some observers remain skeptical, however. George J. Annas believes:
"'It's not a serious attempt to do ethics.... It's a serious attempt to avoid legal
liability."' Id. Whether skeptical or not, health care observers are watching the
compliance programs at both Columbia/HCA and Tenet Healthcare Corp.,
whose predecessor National Medical Enterprises paid millions to settle fraud
charges in the mid-1990s, as potential models for genuine attempts to "do eth-
ics." Pitzer, supra note 147. The government has also urged that responsibility
for ethics as well as legal compliance begin at the top levels of a health care
organization. See Justice Department to Increase, supra note 154 (the DOJ urges
"good stewardship" as a top priority); OIG Compliance Guidance for Hospitals,
63 Fed. Reg. 8987, 8990 n.8 (1998):
The OIG strongly encourages high-level involvement by the hospital's
governing body, Chief Executive Officer, Chief Operating Officer,
General Counsel, and Chief Financial Officer, as well as other medical
personnel as appropriate, in the development of standards of conduct.
Such involvement should help communicate a strong and explicit
statement of compliance goals and standards.
168. See supra notes 105-06, 146-47 and accompanying text.
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Management must both ask the hard questions, and make
sure that they get answered.' 69 If it does not, then eventually
society will-through law. This essay has traced the history of
law's influence on the ethical evolution of health care providers.
It has illustrated how, whether health care professionals liked it
or not, the law has had to address difficult questions in medical
ethics and how it is currently addressing serious questions in
business ethics. Many people do not like the ways that the law
(through courts, legislatures, or enforcement agencies) handles
these hard questions. Many people vehemently disagree with the
law's resolution of ethical dilemmas, or detest the power of law to
coerce societal views of ethical behavior. Until those within the
health care profession and industry assume leadership and take
responsibility to define and debate the ethical questions and con-
tinually refine the ethical answers-in other words, to go beyond
the law and to do the right thing1V°-history is probably bound
to repeat itself. And then the law's presence will loom even
larger in the ethical life of health care organizations.
169. See Fletcher, supra note 162, at 183 (observing that accountability for
meetingJCAHO standards does not rest with the ethics committee: "That obli-
gation clearly falls on the governing body and the most senior administrators
and clinicians."). See also Weber, supra note 148, at 32:
Management may need to develop an institutional framework for
assessing the ethics of any proposed advertising. The key is to have the
right persons ask the right questions. The right questions are questions
about both the content and the impact of the advertising .... The
right persons are those who are willing to ask-and answer-the hard
questions, no matter who is proposing or sponsoring the activity.
170. See ANNAS, supra note 35, at 10. Prof. Annas's suggestion about eth-
ics committees is equally applicable to management:
What we might try... is to engage in a real effort to see if multidis-
ciplinary committees can "do ethics" and encourage real change in
our hospitals and medical care facilities to go beyond the law and risk
management and to "do the right thing." Good ethics (and a good
ethics committee) begins where the law ends.
See also Foubister, supra note 167 ("[A] corporate-led compliance program that
goes beyond the minimum required by law is critical to any business, whether
it's defense or health care."); Pitzer, supra note 147 (according to Alan Yuspeth,
senior vice president at Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp. to over see its ethics
and compliance program: "'At a minimum, we want to ensure compliance with
complex laws and re gulations.... But in a larger sense, we want to do the right
thing."').
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